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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This Appellant's brief is also being submitted in electronic format with hyperIinks for 
each footnote to the Record and Exhibits, to provide ease of reference by the Supreme Court. 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This litigation arose when Plaintiff/Appellant City of Meridian ("City") filed suit against 
Petra, Incorporated ("Petra") for Petra's failures in the performance of its duties as Construction 
Manager in the construction of the new Meridian City Hall (the "MCH"). Petra counterclaimed, 
seeking an increased Fee and Reimbursable Expenses for what Petra alleged were "additional 
services" provided during the construction of the MCH. 
There were fifty-nine (59) days of trial, twenty eight thousand four hundred twenty six 
(28,426) pages of exhibits, and the Clerk's Record on Appeal consists of nine thousand two 
hundred and fifteen (9,215) pages. The District Court, ("DC") issued its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law in a document which, substantively, consisted of twenty nine (29) pages. 
Prior to trial, the City sought dismissal of Petra's claims under the Idaho Tort Claims Act 
("ITCA") as applicable to contract actions under I.e. §50-219. The DC found that the ITCA was 
inapplicable to Petra's claims.] 
The central dispute at trial focused on Petra's duties under the Contract Documents, at the 
core of which was the Construction Management Agreement ("CMA"), which incorporated a 
Petra created Construction Management Plan ("CMP"), the fifty-two (52) Prime Contracts, 
plans, and specifications for the MCH ("Contract Documents"). The DC found the Contract 
I R. 8263. 
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Documents to be unambiguous? The Contract Documents set forth the specific duties Petra was 
to perform as a state licensed construction manager on the City Public Works Project. 
As demonstrated herein, the City focused on the 'four corners', unambiguous contractual 
duties of Petra and the correct application of law to the undisputed facts. The same 'four 
corners' approach in this appeal will address: I) Petra's counterclaim against the City and why it 
must be dismissed; and 2) the City's breach of contract claims against Petra and why the DC 
erred in their dismissal. 
The same approach will then narrow to focus on: a) whether Petra's Fee was fixed, or 
not; b) whether, based upon the DC findings, the structures built on Petra's watch met the 
requirements of the Contract Documents, or not; and c) whether, upon the DC findings, Petra 
breached its duty of trust with the City. 
There being no citation to legal authority in the DC's decision, this brief will provide the 
correct legal authority which will necessitate this Court's reversal of the DC's order. 
B. THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
1. Pre-Trial 
The City sought dismissal of Petra's claims on two separate grounds: First, Petra failed 
to comply with Section 7 of the CMA. Second, Petra failed to comply with the Idaho Tort 
Claims Act (ITCA) in that it failed to timely provide notice of its claims in accord with the 
ITCA. The District Court (DC) denied both motions without providing any legal analysis.3 The 
City also sought to amend its Complaint to add causes of action for fraud, fraud in the 
CR. 8286, ~ P. 
3 R. 6568 - 6570; R. 7340 - 7345. 
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inducement, constructive fraud, gross negligence, and punitive damages.4 The DC denied the 
motion in an Order, which only discussed the punitive damage claim.s 
2. Trial 
During the trial, the City moved for a mistrial on four separate occasions.6 The DC 
denied each motion. The motions were directed to the DC's exclusion of City evidence, while 
allowing Petra to use witnesses, who were not timely disclosed, to proffer previously undisclosed 
expert opinion. The DC further failed to allow significant rebuttal testimony from the City.7 
The DC entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on June 10, 2011.8 
3. Post-Trial 
The City requested the DC make additional findings with respect to defenses raised by 
the City, which the DC declined to do.9 The City objected to the fee request of Petra, which the 
DC granted. 1O 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
The City chose Petra to be its Construction Manager to manage the design, and 
construction of the MCH, which was a public works project as defined by Idaho law. I I 
Construction management services provided by a construction manager, such as Petra, are 
governed by Title 54, Chapter 45, Idaho Code. In effect, Petra's task as agent for the City was 
4 R. 975 - 986. 
5 R. 6521 - 6526. 
6 Tr. p. 54, L. 7 - p. 67, L. 15; Tr. p. 6711, L. 7 - p. 6748, L. 6; Tr. p. 6889, L. 23 p. 6904, L. I; 
andTr.p.9013,L.19-p.9021,L.14. 
7 Tr. p. 9797, L. I - p. 9843, L. 10. 
8 R. 8290. 
9 R. 8490 - 8496; R. 9128 - 9129. 
10 R. 8497 - 8498. 
II I.e. §54-1901(2)(c)(iii). 
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not to construct, but to assume the role of the City as Owner, to insure that those doing the actual 
construction did the work correctly, on time, and as agreed in the Contract Documents. 
By contract dated August I, 2006 the City and Petra agreed to the terms of the CMA.12 
Lombard Conrad Associates ("LCA") was engaged by the City to provide architectural services 
under Petra's management. 13 The CMA incorporated by reference the terms of LCA's 
Professional Services Agreement. 14 The City contracted directly with 43 individual Prime 
Contractors, for a total of 52 Prime Contracts. These Prime Contractors provided construction 
work of various types, such as exterior masonry, plumbing, and roofing. The Prime Contracts all 
utilized the same American Institute of Architects (AlA) agreement form, A 10 I ICMa Standard 
Form Agreement Between Owner and Contactor, and the 1997 A20 I ICMa General Conditions, 
plans (drawings) and the Specifications. These forms are specifically designed for projects 
utilizing a Construction Manager whose duties include the management and administration of 
contractors actually performing the work. These contracts were likewise incorporated by 
reference into the CMA between the City and Petra. IS These contract documents, along with a 
document created by Petra called the Construction Management Plan ("CMP"), comprised the 
Contract Documents, which, combined with the applicable Idaho law, formed the basis for 
defining Petra's duties to the City. None of the Contract Documents could be modified, except 
b .. 16 Y WrItIng. 
12 Ex. 2003. 
13 Ex. 2002. 
14 Ex. 2003, p. 10, §3.3. 
15 Ex. 2003, p. 15, §4.7.1. 
16 Ex. 2003, p. 26, §IO.17. 
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The CMA provided for two phases of the project: pre-construction servIces to be 
completed in 6 months, and construction services to be completed in 18 months. The parties 
anticipated the MCH would be complete by July 31, 2008, as reflected in a Petra prepared 
Preliminary Project Schedule "for the design and construction of the project." 17 Petra's 
preparation of this schedule was required by the CMA. 18 
In the CMA, Petra acknowledged and accepted "the relationship of trust and confidence" 
with the City, and that this relationship was a "material consideration" for the City's entry into 
the contract. 19 Petra further agreed that it would "at all times, further the interest" of the City 
"through efficient business administration and management.,,20 
The CMA specifically identified Mr. Gene Bennett ("Bennett") and Mr. Wes Bettis 
("Bettis") as Authorized Representatives of Petra.2I The CMA does not identify an Authorized 
Representative of the City. 22 In the CMA, Petra made certain express representations and 
warranties as identified in sections 2.l.3 through 2.l.5. Petra agreed to comply with all laws.23 
Further Petra agreed to indemnify the City for damages, losses and expenses arising out of or 
resulting from Petra's performance of its duties and responsibilities.24 Petra's scope of services 
17 Ex. 2267, p. 17, "Conceptual Design and Development Schedule." 
18 Ex. 2003, p. II, §4.2. 
19 Ex. 2003, p. 5, §1.1. 
cO ld 
cl Ex. 2003, p. 6, §1.2.2. 
cc Ex. 2003, p. 6, § 1.2. 
23 /d, at p. 8, §2.7. 
2.1 /d, at p. 9, §2.1 O. 
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included both managing and coordinating the design and construction of the project on behalf 
. Y 
of the Clty.-) 
The CMA also provided for a phased work effort by Petra, which included specific tasks. 
In the Preliminary Design Phase, Petra was to prepare the CMP, which was to include staffing 
recommendations for the City with an "explanation of the roles, responsibilities and authority of 
each staff member".26 
In addition to the duties expressly provided in the CMA, it also provides in Section 4.7.1 
that Petra was obligated to perform the duties of the "Construction Manager" as set forth in the 
construction agreements between the City and the Prime Contractors, and as set forth in the AlA 
A-20l/CMa - 1992 General Conditions.27 Section 5.1 of the CMA states: "Time was of the 
essence" as to Petra's performance of its duties.28 
Pursuant to Idaho law, Petra was mandatorily required to provide both a payment and a 
performance bond for its work on this Public Works Project.29 
As it related to Petra's entitlement to compensation for the services it would provide the 
City, the CMA provided for Petra's compensation in the form of a fixed Fee amount of 
$574,000,30 plus certain Reimbursable expenses, which Petra guaranteed would not exceed 
25 Id, at p. II, §4.1 . (emphasis added). 
26 Id, at p. 12, §4.4.1 (a) 
27 Ex. 2017, p. 30, §4.7.1. 
28 Ex. 2017, p. 33, §5.1. 
29 Idaho Code §54-45 I 2. 
JO "As full compensation for Construction Manager's performance under this Agreement, Owner agrees to pay 
Construction Manager a fee of Five Hundred Seventy-four Thousand and Noll OOths Dollars ($574,000.00) (the 
"Construction Manager's Fee)". Ex. 2003, p. 17, §6.1 (emphasis added). 
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$279,812. 31 The CMA also provided for a mechanism by which Petra could seek an increase in 
either its Fee or Reimbursables. Section 7 of the CMA provided that Petra could seek an 
equitable adjustment of its Fee upon the discovery of a circumstance materially affecting its 
services, provided that Petra both notified the City of the circumstances as well as obtaining 
approval before the additional services were provided.32 As it concerned notification to the City, 
the CMA required that the notice be delivered, in writing, to the City, the City Clerk and the City 
Attorney?3 The CMA further identified how the adjustment to the Reimbursable Expenses 
would be calculated by requiring that Petra track and account for the "actual number of hours 
worked in furtherance of the change".34 The CMA contains no reference to Petra being entitled 
to collect any Fee based upon a percentage of the total construction costs. 
As part of the Preliminary Design Phase, Petra was to provide a "Preliminary Price 
Estimate".35 In the period between January 15, 2007 and July 25, 2007, Petra provided four (4) 
such written estimates.36 The DC refers to each of these documents as either "cost estimates" or 
"budgets.,,37 On January 15, 2007 Petra estimated the cost of the MCH to be $15,475,160 or 
$3M Dollars greater than the $12.2M MCH "Budget" included in the CMA.38 On January 15, 
2007 Petra represented in writing that the Construction Management Fee would be the exact 
same sum as stated in the CMA, or $574,000, and that its Reimbursable Expenses would not 
31 Ex.2003,p. 18,§62. 
32 Ex. 2003, p. 20, §7. 
33 Ex. 2003, p. 25, § I 0.14. 
34 Ex. 2003, p. 18, §6.2.2. 
35 Ex. 2003, p. 12, §4.4 
36 Ex. 2007 (January 15,2007); Ex. 2183 (February 12, 2007); Ex. 2145 (April 9, 2007); Ex. 2184 (July 12,2007). 
37 R. 8272, ~~ 86-89. 
38 Ex. 2007, "Total Construction Cost"; See, Ex. 2003, p. 13, §4.4.1(f) 
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exceed the exact same guaranteed sum as stated in the CMA, or $279,812, gIven the cost 
estimate of $15,475,160. 39 Petra knew how to utilize a percentage (%) calculation In the 
preparation of budgets. Petra had the ability, and did utilize a percentage calculation for 
Construction Contingency of 5% in their January 15, 2007 cost estimate.4o 
On February 12,2007, Petra again represented in writing the identical fixed Construction 
Management Fee and unchanged Reimbursable Expenses, even though Petra's new estimated 
MCH cost had grown to $16,254,033.41 Again, Petra demonstrated its ability to, and utilization 
of, a percentage calculation in the budget, which included a Construction Contingency of 5% in 
their April 9, 2007 estimate. 42 On April 3, 2007 the bids were opened for Phase II, which was 
the phase that would commence construction. These bids were those required before actual 
construction could begin. 
On April 9, 2007 Petra again represented in writing to the City its Fee was fixed and that 
its Fee and Reimbursable Expenses would remain exactly as stated in the CMA, despite a now 
significantly larger cost estimate of $18,090,456,43 nearly $6M greater than the $12.2M budget 
in the CMA. 
According to Petra's Master Production Schedule and the testimony of Bennett, building 
construction began on May 7, 2007, when construction of the basement began.44 
39 Ex. 2007, "Construction Mgmt & Site Acquisition Cost," Lines 2, 3; Ex. 2003, p. 17, §6. J and §§6.2.2(a) & 
6.2.2(b ). 
40 Ex. 2007, "Construction Costs", L. 4. 
41 Ex. 2183, "Construction Mgmt & Site Acquisition Cost", LL. 2-3. 
42 Ex. 2145, "Construction Costs", Line 4. 
43 Ex. 2145, "Construction Mgmt & Site Acquisition Cost", LL. 2-3. 
44 Ex. 755, p. 4; Tr. p. 5678, L. 12 - 14. 
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Over two months later, on July 12, 2007 Petra again represented in writing its Fee and 
Reimbursable Expenses would remain exactly as stated in the CMA,45 despite the estimated 
project cost growing to $20,446,813. This "budget" was presented to the Mayor and City 
Council at an open City Council Meeting held on July 24, 2007.46 Bettis, Petra's Project 
Engineer, and its co-Authorized Representative, made the presentation on behalf of Petra. At that 
meeting, Bettis handed out Ex. 2184, the July 12 "budget." Bettis made a detailed representation 
of what Petra knew about changes, and what changes were accounted for in the July 12 "budget" 
of $20M estimated cost presented to the City Council.47 At the City Council meeting, Bettis 
recited every "change" identified by the DC in its decision.48 Bettis ended his presentation with 
the following representation: "What we have attempted to do with this budget is to give us the 
highest budget that we could think of inclusive of all the items, including the 1.5 million dollar 
budget for the plaza and community area.,,49 
Near the onset of the project, the City had created a Mayor's Building Committee. This 
Committee consisted of the Mayor, a City Council Member, and members of the City Staff. 50 
The Building Committee was not authorized by the City Council to make any decisions. 
On August 20, 2007, Petra alleged that it disclosed its intention to request an increase in 
the Construction Management Fee. 51 The minutes of the August 27, 2007 meeting, prepared by 
45 Ex. 2184, "Construction Mgmt & Site Acquisition Cost", LL. 2-3. 
46 Ex. 2025, pp. 45 & 46. 
47 Ex. 2025, pp. 45-46. 
48 Ex. 2025, pp. 45-46; R. 8271, ~ 79. 
49 Ex. 2025, pp. 45-46. 
50 Tr. p. 231, L. 7 - p. 232, L.l 
51 R. 8282, ~ 176. 
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Petra, do not reflect the delivery of the spreadsheet to the Committee, nor do the minutes reflect 
that the spreadsheet was discussed in any manner.52 Nor was a copy contained in the copy of the 
meeting minutes maintained by the City or by Petra.53 
On November 5, 2007, Bettis addressed a letter to Mr. Keith Watts ("Watts"), as 
Purchasing Agent, not "Authorized Representative," entitled "Notice of Intent to submit formal 
Change Order Request".54 Signed by Bettis, the letter states it was submitted "[i]n accordance 
with Article 7(b)" of the CMA.55 The letter further states that Petra seeks an " ... additional 
Construction Management Fee for significant changes in project size, complexity and budget. 
The project size has increased from 80,000 SF to 100,000 SF with a full basement. The 
corresponding budget has increased from $12.2 Million to a current estimate of $19.6 
Million ... ,,56 "The additional fee is based on the difference of contract values, $7.4 Million at 
4.7% with a Phase IV -Plaza & Site Improvements Budget of $1.5 Million, or a total fee increase 
of $347,800.00.,,57 Bettis further stated that a "formal Change Order Request" would be 
forwarded at the end of November 2007 following the development of a "final budget". Petra 
failed to provide the formal Change Order Request by the end of November 2007. 
On April 8, 2008, by letter directed to "Mr. Keith Watts, Purchasing Agent" Petra 
provided its proposed "Change Order No.2" for additional Construction Management Fee. The 
proposed Change Order states in pertinent part: 
52 Tr. p. 5757, L. 24 - p. 5758, L. 4; Ex. 2136, p. 289. 
53 Ex. 2136, p. 287 - 301. 
51 Ex. 2285. 
55 Ex. 2285. 
5(, Ex. 2003, p. 13, §4.4.1(f); Ex. 2285. 
57 Ex. 2285. 
-15-
"To accommodate the changes the building budget has increased from 
$12,200,000 to $20,421,103.58 This results in a net increase of $8,221,103 
to the budget. Using the contract eM rate of 4.7% on the budget 
increase yields a total fee increase of $386,392 ... ,,59 
On May 9, 2008, one month after its submission to the City, Mr. Tom Coughlin 
("Coughlin"), in his role as co-project manager with Bennett, wrote an e-mail asking Watts the 
"status" of Petra's Change Order request.60 That same day, Watts replied: "As for the Petra 
Change Order, Council was not happy with it and you will need to address it at a Council 
Meeting in DETAIL before they will take any action. Please let me know if you want to present 
it to them Tuesday night.,,61 
Petra chose never to appear before the City Council to address the Change Order 
request. 62 On May 29, 2008, twenty days following Watts' e-mail, Petra's Change Order request 
was rejected by the City.63 Mr. Ted Baird, Assistant City Attorney states: "Simply applying a 
percentage to the total budget is not acceptable.,,64 
The Contract Documents included both plans (drawings) and technical specifications 
which were to be complied with by the Prime Contractors. Petra's duties required that Petra 
inspect and reject any work not complying with the Contract Documents, including the plans and 
58 It should be noted that this figure is only $25,710 smaller than the July 24, 2007 amount presented at the open 
City Council meeting. 
59 Ex. 2309, p. 3. (emphasis added). 
('0 Ex. 2705, p. I. 
6J Ex. 2705, p. I. (emphasis added). 
6" Tr. p. 3118, L. 3 - p. 3119, L. 25. 
63 Ex. 2326. 
64 Ex. 2326. 
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specifications.65 The DC found that Petra agreed to reject any work of a contractor that was not 
in compliance with the construction documents.66 
The heating/ventilation/air conditioning ("HVAC") system was installed by Hobson 
Fabricating. The HV AC system was required, by the specifications, to undergo perfonnance 
testing, with final written test results to be a submittal as proof that the system performed in 
accordance with specific performance standards.67 Hobson never provided a final written test 
result demonstrating that the system performed as required. Hobson provided a "preliminary" 
test and balance report, ("TAB Report"), which demonstrated the HV AC system did not meet 
specified perfonnance requirements.68 Petra failed to inspect and reject the work. 
Alpha Masonry and M.R. Miller provided work on the water features. The entire project, 
including the water features, was to be designed under Petra's management.69 The DC found that 
the water features had a design flaw. 70 The water features are comprised of waterfalls, ponds, and 
a canal. The water features were designed to be self-contained, and operated by a pump/piping 
system meeting specific design criteria. Moreover, the water feature system was not intended to 
leak, and required post-construction pressure testing to demonstrate that it was leak proof. 71 At 
the time of trial, when operated, the water features were leaking at a rate of approximately 5000 
65 Ex. 2003, p. 16, §§4.7.9 and 4.7.10. 
66 R. 8267, ~ 32. 
67 Ex. 2153, p. 64, § 1.3(A)(5); Ex. 2153, pp. 273-288, §§ 1.4, 3.5(D), 3.16-3.18; Ex. 2153, pp. 289-299, §§ 1.1 (C), 
1.2(A)( 15) & 1.2(D). 
68 Ex. 2155; Tr. p. 1653, L. 22 - p. 1662, L. 15. 
69 Ex. 2003, p. 1 I, §4.1. 
70 R. 8278, ~ 137. 
71 Tr. p. 8513, L. 21 - p. 8514, L. 5. 
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gallons per day.72 There were no post-construction pressure testing records. Petra failed to 
require the pressure testing73 and failed to inspect and reject the work. 
Western Roofing, Inc. ("Western") was the roof system contractor. The roof system was 
to be comprised of both physical structures and a coated roofing material. The roof system was 
intended to be leak proof. LCA was to design the roof under Petra's management.74 The DC 
found the roof design did not include saddle flashings. 75 Saddle flashings are used to create 
waterproof barriers where roof components intersect with walls. Commencing with the first rain 
following the City's occupancy of the building, and consistently through, and up to the time of 
trial the roof leaked. 76 The roof structures were required to comply with the plans and 
specifications. They did not, and do not comply. Petra failed to inspect and reject the work. 
TMC, Inc. ("TMC") was the masonry contractor. The DC found that the external 
masonry work contains flaws in workmanship.77 The DC found that the masonry had missing 
grout, did not conform to the plans and specifications, and had misaligned stonework.78 TMC 
completely failed to install two large metal flashings necessary to keep the building watertight. 79 
Petra failed to inspect and reject the work. The DC also found that Petra authorized a $40,000 
overpayment to TMC. 8o 
72 Tr. p. 8531, LL. 3-23. 
n Ex. 2934; Tr. p. 8518, L. 20 - p. 8519, L. 14. 
74 Ex. 2003, p. II, §4.1. 
75 R. 8277, ~ 132. 
76 Tr. p. 277, L. 4 - p. 278, L. 10; Tr. p. 4107, L. 5 - p. 4108, L. 2. 
77 R. 8274, ~ 104. 
78 R. 8275, ~~ 106, 107, and 108. 
79 Tr. p. 3642, L. 2 - p. 3647, L. 14; See. Appendix A. 
80 R. 8274, ~ 99. 
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Buss Mechanical ("Buss") was the plumbing contractor. Petra knowingly allowed Buss to 
improperly install the wrong piping below grade in the basement. 8] The plans and specifications 
called for Buss to install hubless cast iron piping below grade in the basement.82 Petra allowed 
Buss to install PVC plastic. Petra failed to inspect and reject the work. 
The DC found that the construction of the Mayor's suite and reception occurred without 
the installation of closure strips and caulking required to keep out air, water and insects.83 The 
work in this area was never completed in accord with the plans and specifications. Petra failed to 
inspect and reject the work. 
Petra approved charges to the City for Petra's own errors, and those of contractors. Petra 
charged the City for an error made by its own superintendent in establishing the benchmark for a 
floor elevation.84 Petra charged the City for damage to flooring that was caused by other Prime 
Contractors.85 
Petra was required to keep receipts for all charges for all General Conditions 
86 Reimbursables. The DC found that Petra charged the City for General Conditions 
Reimbursables that were not provided for in the CMP or which exceeded the limits for such 
reimbursables. 87 Petra charged the City for its own natural gas billing for Petra's private office 
building. The DC found Petra's conduct to be inequitable.88 
81 Tr. p. 3712, L. 4 - p. 3713, L. 5; Tr. 3851, L. 18 - p. 3852, L. 5.; Ex. 2130, p. 105, Div. 15. 
82 Ex. 2733, pp. 3-4, §3.2B; Ex. 2672, pp. 27-28, §3.2B. 
83 R. 8281,,-r 166. 
84 Ex. 2059; Tr. p. 6218, L. 12 - p. 6221, L. 4. 
85 Tr. p. 1763, L. 17 - p. 1764, L. 13; Tr. p. 1777, L. 23 - p. 1778, L. 14; Tr. p. 1779, L. 7 - p. 1780, L. 19. 
86 Ex. 2003, p. 7, §2.4 
87 R. 8273, ,-r 92 
88 R. 8273, ,-r 94. 
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Petra failed to post a performance and payment bond required by state law.89 
Each of the 52 Prime Contracts required a specific quality control process whereby Petra 
was required to certify, in writing, that each of the Prime Contractor's work was 'substantially 
complete', based upon inspections to be performed by Petra.90 Not one Certificate of Substantial 
Completion was issued in compliance with the 52 Prime Contracts on the MCH. 91 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The City presents the following issues on appeal: 
A. The DC committed clear error with regard to its Factual Findings as well as 
Conclusions of Law that Petra had proved its Counterclaim. 
I. The DC erred in its Findings that the City had been notified of Petra's alleged 
entitlement to an increased Fee and Reimbursables before Petra had commenced 
providing services in furtherance of any change. 
2. The DC committed clear error in its legal application of the provisions of Section 
7 of the CMA based on the undisputed facts concerning Petra's cost estimate and the 
timing of Petra's "additional services." 
a. The DC's conclusion that Petra "notified" the City is clearly erroneous. 
b. The DC committed clear error when it awarded Petra an increased Fee 
based on a percentage without proof of the increased Fee's relationship to the alleged 
changes. 
3. The DC's Conclusion of Law that the City waived its contractual right to pre-
approve Petra's request for equitable adjustment is clear error. 
4. The DC Failed to apply Section 8 of the CMA to dismiss Petra's claims. 
5. The DC failed to apply the Idaho Tort Claims Act to Petra's claims. 
89 Tr. p. 3005, L. 18 - p. 3006, L. 4. 
90 Ex. 2017, p. 42, §9.8. 
91 Tr. p. 7320, L. 17 - p. 7321, L. I; Tr. p. 8904, L. 4 - 9 
-20-
CMA. 
B. The DC committed clear error by failing to conclude that Petra had breached the 
I. The DC committed clear error when it concluded that Petra did not assume a 
fiduciary relationship with the City as a result of the express terms of the CMA. 
2. The DC recognized that Petra overcharged the City, but erred when it failed to 
recognize the same as a breach, and then awarded damages on a speculative and arbitrary 
basis. 
3. The DC erred when it failed to find that Petra breached the CMA by charging the 
City for costs associated with its own negligence and the negligence of others. 
4. The DC committed clear error when it failed to find that Petra materially breached 
its agreement with the City by failing to obtain payment and performance bonds. 
5. The DC committed clear error when it failed to conclude that Petra materially 
breached the CMA by not fulfilling the contractually required Substantial Completion 
process. 
6. The DC committed clear error when it failed to conclude that Petra breached the 
CMA by failing to properly administer the Prime Contracts. 
7. The DC Committed clear error when it failed to conclude that Petra materially 
breached its contractual duty by failing to advise the City as to liquidated damages. 
8. The DC committed clear error when it failed to conclude that Petra materially 
breached the CMA by failing to meet the Project Schedule. 
9. The DC committed clear error when it failed to conclude that Petra materially 
breached the CMA by failing to require the key submittals for the water feature. 
10. Petra breached the CMA by failing to require demonstrated performance of the 
HVAC system to meet specification performance standards. 
II. The DC committed clear error when it disregarded multiple incidents of Petra's 
failure to inspect and reject deficient and defective work, each constituting a material 
breach. 
a. The work of TMC was defective and deficient and Petra failed to inspect 
and reject TMC's work. 
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I. The DC erred in admitting and relying upon untimely and undisclosed 
expert testimony. 
b. The work of Western Roofing was defective and deficient and Petra failed 
to inspect and reject Western's work. 
c. The work of Buss Mechanical was defective and deficient and Petra 
knowingly failed to inspect and reject Buss' Work. 
e. The DC Erred by disregarding credible evidence on damages. 
D. The DC failed to allow the City to amend its Complaint to add additional claims. 
E. The District Court erred in awarding attorney fees. 
III. ATTORNEYS' FEES ON APPEAL 
Upon reversal of the DC, the City shall be entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal 
pursuant to §1 0.6 of the CMA and I.e. §12-120(3). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. THE DC COMMITTED CLEAR ERROR WITH REGARD TO ITS FACTUAL FINDINGS 
AS WELL AS CONCLUSIONS OF LA W THAT PETRA DAD PROVED ITS 
COUNTERCLAIM. 
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, the DC concluded that Petra had proved 
its counterclaim against the City without reference to any cause of action actually pled by Petra. 
The DC then awarded Petra damages beyond the fixed amounts for its services, as contained in 
the express terms of the CMA, using as its basis, a percentage of the total construction costs. 
This conclusion of law appears based upon two express findings by the DC: 1) that the City had 
approved Petra's cost budgets through July 2007 showing an increase in size, scope, and cost; 
-22-
and 2) that at the time of these approvals "Petra had not yet provided additional services on the 
. ,,92 proJect. 
As demonstrated herein, and revealed by the evidentiary record presented, the key DC 
Findings of Fact are clearly erroneous, and these clear errors are compounded by the DC's legal 
conclusions which reaches a result directly contrary to the express, unambiguous terms of the 
CMA. 
The DC correctly found that Petra provided the City with four (4) separate written cost 
estimates identifying costs exceeding the $12.2 Million "budget" for the construction of the 
MCl-I. However, the DC wholly ignored that each and everyone of these budgets reflected no 
commensurate change to the contractually fixed Fee of $574,000.93 In point of fact, not only did 
these budgets not reflect any increased Fee as a result of the increased costs, but Petra 
undisputedly represented to the City that its final Fee and Reimbursable expenses dated July, 12, 
2007 would not increase one dollar as a result of the increased costs. 
The DC further failed to consider, the undisputed fact, that Petra had without notice to the 
City, in fact, begun providing "additional" services for which Petra would later seek an increased 
Fee and Reimbursables. The commencement of "additional services" was months prior to when 
the DC found that Petra allegedly submitted its first notice of an intention to seek an increased 
CM Fee.94 Compounding these errors, the District Court then disregarded the unambiguous, 
express provisions of the CMA, which required Petra to notify the City and obtain the City'S 
92 R. 8272, ~~ 81-88; R. 8282, ~ 177; R. 8285, ~ G. 
93 Ex. 2007 (January 15.2007), Ex. 2183 (February 12,2007), Ex. 2145 (April 9, 2007) and Ex. 2184 (July 12. 
2007). 
94 R. 8282, ~ 176. 
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approval, prior to providing any additional services for which an alleged increase in Fee or 
Reimbursables might be due.95 These clear errors of fact and law will be explained in turn below, 
each of which, individually and in combination, warrant this Court's reversal of the DC's 
decision. 
1. The District Court Erred in Its Finding that the City had Been 
Notified of Petra's Alleged Entitlement to an Increased Fee and 
Reimbursables Before Petra had Commenced Providing Services in 
Furtherance of Any Change. 
The DC's conclusion that Petra is entitled to an increased Fee and Reimbursables is 
premised upon its factual findings that the City had approved Petra's budgets indicating various 
changes, and resultant increased costs, to the MCH before any of the services in furtherance of 
those changes had been commenced by Petra. The key DC factual findings find no support in 
the evidentiary record, and are expressly contrary to the evidence. The Supreme Court is free to 
set aside the DC findings if they are clearly erroneous.96 
Pursuant to the express terms of the CMA, prior to the commencement of construction by 
the Prime Contractors, Petra was required to provide both a "Preliminary Price Estimate" and a 
"Final Cost Estimate" to the City.97 As the DC recognized, Petra prepared four (4) written 
preliminary price estimates and/or "budgets,,98 that were presented to the City.99 The four 
~Ex.2003,p.20,§7. 
96 I.R.C.P. 52(a); J1cCray 1'. Rosenkrance, 135 Idaho 509, 513, 20 P.3d 693, 697 (200 I); In re Williamson v. City of 
AkCal!. 135 Idaho 452, 454, 19 P.3d 766, 768 (200 I). 
97 Ex. 2003. p. 12, §4.4.I(c) & p. 14, §4.5.9. 
98 The DC uses the term "budget" to describe the spreadsheets which Petra gave to the City reflecting first, Petra's 
cost estimates, then actual costs as bids were received. R. 8272, ~~ 85 - 87. 
99 Exs. 2007. 2183, 2145, and 2184. 
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"budgets" provided to the City were dated January 15, 2007,100 February 12, 2006,101 April 9, 
200i02 and July 12, 2007. 103 The DC also found, based on disputed evidence that notice was 
presented to the City on August 20, 2007. As discussed below, while the City disputes that any 
notice was presented on August 20, 2007, the indisputable facts arising from the budgets actually 
presented reveals that the DC made two clearly erroneous findings. 
First, the DC found that the City had "accepted the preliminary price estimate" as 
presented in January of 2007 as well as "approved" each budget estimate presented to it from 
January through July of 2007. 104 An examination of each of these allegedly "approved" budgets 
demonstrates that in each budget Petra identified increased costs resulting from City directed 
changes, however Petra represented no increases in either the identified Fee or the Reimbursable 
expenses. Thus, to the extent that it can be said that the City "approved" anything in regard to 
these budgets, it must be said that the City approved identified increases to cost of construction 
with no resultant increases to the Fee or Reimbursables. Petra indisputably represented to the 
City, coincident with the final July "budget" it presented, that there would be "no change" as to 
either its Fee nor Reimbursable expenses and that the July budget represented "the highest 
budget that [Petra] could think of inclusive of all of the items.,,105 Thus, the DC committed clear 
error with regard to Findings of Fact 85-90 when it concluded that the City had approved the 
budgets submitted by Petra while the DC failed to recognize that these Petra budgets represented 
100 Ex. 2007 
101 Ex. 2183 (Note: Petra apparently dated the document 2006 in error.) 
102 Ex. 2145 
103 Ex. 2184. 
104 R. 8272, ~~ 85-90. 
105 Ex. 2025, pp. 45 & 46. Ex. 2184 
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no increase in the Fee or Reimbursables due to Petra as a result of the escalating costs from City 
directed changes. 
Second, and perhaps more erroneously, the DC concluded that at the time Petra submitted 
the notice to the City, "Petra had not yet provided additional services on the project.,,106 This 
finding is directly contrary to the uncontroverted evidence in the form of Petra's Master 
Production Schedule, and the testimony of Petra's agent Bennett, which established that 
construction of the "basement" began on May 7, 2007. 107 This undisputed fact is of significant 
legal import, as the DC expressly found that the City'S addition of a basement was one of the 
"changes" that "increased Petra's services and reimbursable expenses".108 Thus, nearly two 
months prior to the July 2007 budget which Petra represented was "the highest budget that 
[Petra] could think of inclusive of all of the items," 109 and nearly four (4) months prior to the 
alleged first "notice" to the City of Petra's assertion of a "percentage of the budget" increase in 
Fee, construction had commenced and Petra had begun providing its claimed "additional 
services" related to "the Change". In fact, not only had Petra's additional services related to 
construction of the basement begun prior to any suggestion that Petra would seek an increase in 
Fee and Reimbursable expenses, the basement was completed as of July 9, 2007. 110 Petra's so-
called additional services as to the basement were completed three (3) days prior to the July 12 
"budget" and fifteen (I5) days prior to Bettis representation to the City Council that Petra's Fee 
106 R. 8282, ~ 177. 
107 Ex. 755, p. 4. 
108 R. 8271. ~~ 79 & 80. 
109 Ex. 2025. pp. 45 & 46; Ex. 2184 
110 Ex. 755. p. 4. L. 5. 
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and Reimbursable expenses would not increase by even a dollar. The DC conclusion in Finding 
of Fact 177 that "Petra had not yet provided additional services on the project" is clearly 
erroneous. 
The City has identified one item of "change" for which additional services were provided 
and completed before the submission of any alleged notice of an intent to seek an increased Fee. 
The record reflected by the July 2007 City Council meeting minutes, establishes that each and 
every "change" found by the DC, Petra knew of each "change" months prior to its submission of 
any claim for increased Fee and Reimbursables. 
The DC was clearly erroneous as a matter of fact, and committed legal error with regard 
to the legal effect of the City's alleged "acceptance" of the four Petra budgets submitted from 
January through July 2007 when the DC failed to acknowledge and confirm that these budgets 
did not include any increased Fee or Reimbursables for Petra. Further, Petra undisputedly began 
providing additional services, without notice to nor approval by the City. The DC's finding is 
clearly erroneous, and thus the foundations of the DC's legal conclusions are eviscerated. 
2. The DC Committed Clear Error in Its Legal Application of the 
Provisions of Section 7 of the CMA Based on the Undisputed Facts 
Concerning Petra's Cost Estimate and the Timing of Petra's 
"Additional Services". 
The foregoing errors expose the DC's erroneous legal application of the express and 
unambiguous terms of the CMA addressing circumstances under which Petra might be entitled to 
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obtain an increased Fee and Reimbursables. The Supreme Court exercises free review over 
conclusions of law. III 
Although Section 7 the CMA contains an express provIsion addressing the specific 
mechanism by which Petra might be entitled to an increase in Fee or Reimbursables, the DC's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law make no reference to it. Thus, the DC's determination 
of Petra's entitlement to its increased Fee and Reimbursables is made without any consideration 
and application of this provision. This is clear error. 
Section 7 of the CMA provides: 
7. CHANGES 
Changes in Construction Manager's services (not involving a 
cardinal change to the scope of the services) may be accomplished after 
the execution of this Agreement upon Owner's request or if Construction 
Manager's services are affected by any of the following: 
(a) A change in the instructions or approvals given by 
Owner that necessitate revisions to previously prepared documents 
or the reperformance of previously performed services; 
(b) Significant change to the project, including, but not 
limited to size, quality, complexity, Owner's schedule, budget or 
procurement method; 
(c) Construction Manager performs additional services 
because of active Owner interference pursuant to Section 5.2 
above,or 
(d) Preparation for and attendance at a dispute resolution 
proceeding or a legal proceeding except where Construction 
Manager is a party thereto or where the Construction Manager's 
performance is an issue in such proceeding. 
III Bolgerv. Lance. 137 Idaho 792, 794, 53 P.3d 1211, 1213 (2002). 
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Except as otherwise set forth in this Agreement, if any of the above 
circumstances materially affect Construction Manager's services, 
Construction Manager shall be entitled to an equitable adjustment in the 
Schedule of Performance, the Construction Manager's Fee and/or the not-
to- exceed limits for reimbursable expenses, as mutually agreed by 
Owner and Construction Manager. Prior to providing any additional 
services, Construction Manager shall notifY Owner of the proposed 
change in services and receive Owner's approval for the change. 
Except for a change due to the fault of Construction Manager, a change 
shall entitle Construction Manager to an equitable adjustment in the 
Schedule of Performance, Construction Manager's Fee and/or the not-to-
exceed limits for reimbursable expenses as mutually agreed by Owner and 
Construction Manager. I 12 
The express requirement of Section 7 imposed a duty upon Petra "prior to providing any 
additional services" to notify the City of its claim of additional services and receive the City's 
approval for the change. The presence of the term "shall" with regard to Petra's obligation in 
this regard cannot be understated. 1I3 
Petra wholly and completely failed to comply with these express and unambiguous 
provisions and the DC's implied conclusion to the contrary is clearly erroneous. At most, the 
DC's conclusion of law only goes halfway in the proper enforcement of the provisions of Section 
7. For if, as the DC concluded, the City "accepted" the budgets prepared by Petra on four 
separate occasions concerning the intended changes to the MCH, Petra obtained that acceptance 
based upon Petra's repeated, express representations that Petra's CM Fee and Reimbursables did 
not increase as a result. 
111 Ex. 2003, p. 20, §7. (emphasis added). 
113 Trumha// /n1'eSlmenIS. Ud /1'. Wachol'ia Bank, N .A., 436 F .3d 443, 447 (4th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that 
"Plaintiffs are of course correct that "shall" typically is mandatory in nature."). 
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Whether or not the proper application of law would permit Petra to obtain the City's 
"acceptance" of its budget without being thereafter similarly bound to the representation 
contained in each budget (as confirmed verbally by its agent that there would be no increase in 
the Fee and Reimbursables) the DC committed clear error when it concluded that this 
notification and acceptance came before any additional services were provided in conjunction 
with the construction of the building. 
Petra's own Master Project Schedule and direct testimony of Bennett, irrefutably and 
conclusively established that Petra notified the City of its percentage of budget claim, after it had 
already proceeded to perform additional services. I 14 Only after additional services had been 
provided, and in the case of the basement, completed, did Petra seek an increased Fee, thus 
plainly depriving the City of the mandatory opportunity to review and approve or reject Petra's 
proposed additional services. Section 7 plainly and unambiguously does not permit such a 
conclusion. 
When interpreting a contract, this Court begins with the document's language. I IS "In the 
absence of ambiguity, the document must be construed in its plain, ordinary and proper sense, 
according to the meaning derived from the plain wording of the instrument." I 16 As noted, the DC 
found the contract clear, and unambiguous. I 17 Thus, in interpreting an unambiguous contract and 
determining whether there has been a violation of that contract is an issue of law subject to free 
11-1 Ex. 755, p. 4. 
115 Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Pa=. 144 Idaho 304, 308, 160 P.3d 743, 747 (2007). 
116 C & G. Inc. 1'. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 765, 25 P.3d 76, 78 (200 I). 
117 R. 8286, ~ P. 
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review. 118 It is undisputed, that the DC found Petra to have provided additional services 
associated with the addition of the basement as a change. It is likewise undisputed, that Petra 
provided those services without notice to the City. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the 
implied conclusion of the DC that Petra complied with Section 7 in seeking its alleged 
entitlement to an increased Fee and Reimbursables. 
Strict compliance with the notice provisions serve important public interests: 
notice and documentation provisions serve an important public interest in 
that they 'provide public agencies with timely notice of deviations from 
budgeted expenditures or of any supposed malfeasance, and allow them to 
take early steps to avoid extra or unnecessary expense, make any 
necessary adjustments, mitigate damages and avoid the waste of public 
funds. 18 F.Supp.2d at 294. 119 
Petra, having materially breached this fundamental contractual duty, is barred from 
seeking the sums claimed pursuant to Section 7. 
a. The DC's Conclusion that Petra "Notified" the City is Also Clearly 
Erroneous. 
Even if Section Ts requirement that Petra shall seek approval from the City before 
commencing any additional services could somehow be evaded, the evidence in the record 
establishes that the alleged August 20, 2007 spreadsheet cannot constitute notice to the City. 
Under Section 10.14 of the CMA, "all notice" was required to be not only personally delivered 
or sent by certified mail, but also required a "copy to" the "Office of the City Clerk" and the 
118 Opportunity, LLC v. Ossell'arde, 136 Idaho 602, 605-06, 38 P,3d 1258, 1261-62 (2002), 
119 Ra::orback Contractors of Kansas. Inc. v. Ed of County Com'rs of Johnson County, 43 Kan. App. 2d 527, 536, 
227 P.3d 29, 35 (2010) 
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"City Attorney's Office".120 The undisputed evidence in the record establishes that Petra did not 
comply with this requirement. 
Moreover, the purported August 20, 2007 notice fails to describe any change in services. 
At line 71 of the exhibit, the line referring to the services, which would be Petra's "reimbursable 
cost", reveals that there is no change. 12l The stated amount remains identical to the amount 
stated in Section 6 of the CMA, where Petra's "services" are quantified for payment. In short, 
there is no notice of a proposed change in services in the alleged notice. 
Finally, even if it could be argued that this claimed notice complied with the delivery 
requirements and contained an identification of alleged additional services, the evidence 
establishes that this claimed notice was never presented to the Mayor and City Council "for 
approval of the change", as is required by the CMA.122 
Accordingly, there are multiple bases upon which this Court can identify the presence of 
clear legal errors with regard to the DC application of law to the undisputed facts, such that a 
complete reversal of the DC's conclusions in this regard is warranted. 
b. The DC Committed Clear Error When It Awarded Petra an 
Increased Fee Based on a Percentage Without Proof of the 
Increased Fee's Relationship to the Alleged Changes. 
In awarding Petra's damages relating to its claim for increased Fee and Reimbursable, the 
DC improperly used extrinsic evidence, rather than employ the contractually defined 
120 Ex. 2003, p. 25, §10.14. 
121 Ex. 2148. 
122 Ex. 2003, p. 7, §2.2 "Communications"; " ... Construction Manager shall notify Owner of any decisions that 
are required to be made by Owner, and any deadlines pertaining thereto. Construction Manager shall consult with 
and advise Owner with respect to any such decisions." (emphasis added). 
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methodology for establishing appropriate increases, as required in the CMA. As it concerned 
Reimbursables, the contract required Petra to track and account for the "actual number of hours 
worked in furtherance of the change.,,123 The DC specifically identified separate and distinct 
items of "change". 124 Although Bennett acknowledged that Petra could have tracked the actual 
hours, Petra did not track any of the time alleged to have been worked in furtherance of the 
specifically identified changes. 125 As a result, there was no evidence presented by Petra as to 
how much, if any, actual additional increases in services were provided by Petra as a result of 
any particular change. The DC erred as a matter of law in failing to require this proof. The DC 
disregarded the express, contractually fixed and guaranteed cost provisions of Petra's Fee and 
Reimbursable entitlements under the CMA, and disregarded the mandatory procedures 
(conditions precedent) for seeking any increase as a result of a change. As noted, the CMA 
contract document contains no reference to any percentage for determination of Fee. Rather, it is 
apparent that the DC simply adopted the arbitrary methodology employed by Petra itself when it 
sought an increased Fee, which was simply to claim a "contract CM rate" increase in its Fee 
based upon a percentage. 126 
While Section 7, clearly defines the mandatory condition precedent to be employed for 
increases in Reimbursables as a result of an owner approved change, Section 7 states that Petra's 
123 Ex. 2003, p. 18. §6.2.2. 
12~R. 8271, ~ 79. 
125 Tr. p. 6077, L. 16 - p. 6078, L. 22. 
126 Ex. 2309, p. 1-3, Letter and proposed Change Order No.2 of Gene Bennett, dated April4, 2008; 
Tr. p. 240, L. 13 - 18; Tr. p. 24 L L. II - 18; Tr. p. 1978, L. 2 - 14; Tr. p. 1994, L. I - 14; 
Tr. p. 1994, L. 25 - p. 1995, L. 7; Tr. p. 2014, L. 23 - p. 2015, L. 2. 
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Fee is to be subject to an equitable adjustment agreed by the parties.127 While, there is no 
specific methodology for the increased Fee, as exists for increased Reimbursables, it should not 
be overlooked that both sections are focused upon the necessity of material increases attributable 
to the change. I n fact, Section 6.2.2 expressly identifies the number of hours that Petra estimated 
it would require to provide the services required under the CMA. Thus, while an "adjustment" 
may be "equitable" it cannot be arbitrary and without any relation whatsoever to a finding of 
material change that justifies the increase in the first instance. 
"The courts possess no roving commission to rewrite contracts.,,128 "In construing a 
written instrument this Court must consider it as a whole and give meaning to all the provisions 
of the writing to the extent possible." 129 In short, unless the DC finds a provision to be 
ambiguous, which was not the case here, the DC must seek to enforce the tenns of the parties 
agreement consistent with the express terms themselves. Thus, if an increase for a change is to be 
warranted, proof of the relationship between the material increase and the change is necessary. 
For example, it takes no additional service to manage the installation of a sink that costs three 
times as much as the sink first selected by the owner. 
The DC erred as a matter of law, when it chose to utilize evidence extrinsic to the 
contract, to create and attach a percentage to the ultimate increased cost, as its method of 
awarding an increase in Fee. Interpretation of unambiguous language in a contract is a question 
127 Ex. 2003, p. 20, §7. 
128 Smith v. idaho State University Federal Credit Union. I 14 Idaho, 680, 760 P. 2d 19,24 (1988). 
129 Jiagic Valley Radiology Associates, P.A. 1'. Professional Business Service, inc., 119 Idaho 558, 565, 808 P .2d 
1303, 13 I 0 (199 I); see also. /,'ordstrom 1'. Guidon, 135 Idaho 343, 347, 17 P.3d 287, 291 (2000); Likley 1' . • 'v/ax 
Herbold, inc., 133 Idaho 209, 2 I I, 984 P.2d 697, 699 (1999); :'v1agic Valley Radiology Associates. PA. 1'. 
Professional Business Ser1'ices, fIlC., I 19 Idaho 558, 808 P.2d 1303 (199 I). 
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of law. no As the DC found the CMA and related Contract Documents to be unambiguous, 
resorting to extrinsic evidence for interpretation or application was error by the DC. "If a written 
contract is complete upon its face and unambiguous, no fraud or mistake being alleged, extrinsic 
evidence of prior or contemporaneous negotiations or conversations is not admissible to 
contradict, vary, alter, add to, or detract from the terms of the contract."l31 "A written contract 
that contains a merger clause is complete upon its face.,,132 
The CMA contains a merger clause. 133 The purpose of a merger clause is to establish that 
the parties have agreed that the contract contains the parties' entire agreement. The merger clause 
is not merely a factor to consider in deciding whether the agreement is integrated; it proves the 
agreement is integrated. To hold otherwise would require the parties to list in the contract 
everything upon which they had not agreed and hope that such list covers every possible prior or 
contemporaneous agreement that could later be alleged. 134 
Despite the clear, express and unambiguous contractual provIsIons, the DC failed to 
requIre Petra to support its claim for equitable adjustment with evidence of the actual hours 
worked in furtherance of each change, or even any proof of how their services increased as a 
result of any change, but rather simply awarded Petra an amount equal to 4.7% of the increased 
construction costs. Even if the DC were empowered to ignore the evidence of Petra's non-
compliance with the requirements of Section 7 concerning written notice and pre-approval by the 
130 Cannon v. Perry, 144 Idaho 728, 731, 170 P.3d 393, 396 (2007). 
131 Kimbrough v. Reed. 130 Idaho 512, 943 P.2d 1232 (1997). 
132 ld.: Chambers 1'. 7homas. 123 Idaho 69, 844 P .2d 698 (1992); Valley Bank v. Christensen. 119 Idaho 496, 808 
P.2d 415 (1991). 
133 Ex. 2003, p. 26, §10.17. 
134 HOlfardv. Per/Y, 141 Idaho 139, 141-42, 106 P.3d 465, 467-68 (2005). 
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City as a condition precedent to an increase in either its Fee or Reimbursables, the DC is not 
empowered to wholly ignore the provisions of the CMA which define what amount Petra would 
be entitled to, if it were entitled to an increased Fee at all. 
3. The DC's Conclusion of Law that the City Waived Its Contractual 
Right to Pre-Approve Petra's Request for Equitable Adjustment is 
Clear Error. 
Although the DC makes no express reference to the provisions of Section 7, the DC 
nonetheless concluded, "[t]he City waived its contractual right to pre-approve the request for 
equitable adjustment and is estopped from denying fee request." 135 The DC's Conclusion of Law 
is clear error as is evident from the complete lack of any factual or legal analysis to support its 
conclusion. 
First, the DC determined to apply estoppel principles against the City despite the fact that 
Petra neither alleged, nor did the City try by consent, any Petra claim of Estoppel nor Waiver of 
Section 7 as a theory of affirmative relief. Neither Petra's Counterclaim, nor its Amended 
Counterclaim made any claims other than I) breach of contract, 2) unjust enrichment, and 3) 
quantum meruit. 136 Petra's claims for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit fail, as a matter of 
law, where there is an express contract. 137 For this reason alone, the DC conclusion must be 
reversed. 
The DC fails to identify any act by the City Council that could constitute a waiver of the 
requirements of Section 7. It must be conceded that Petra contracted with a political subdivision 
135 R. 8286, ~ I. 
136 R. 84; R. 374. 
137 Bakker 1'. Thunder Spring-Wareham. LLe. 141 Idaho 185, 191, 108 P.3d 332, 338 (2005) 
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of the state of Idaho, and all authority of the City is vested in the City Council. I.e. §50-70 1. 
Under Idaho law, the only legal method for any act by the City Council, is by vote in open 
meeting, pursuant to the Idaho Open Meetings Act, I.e. §67-2340 et seq.: 
The act defines a meeting as "the convening of a governing body of a 
public agency to make a decision or to deliberate toward a decision on any 
matter." I.e. §67-2341 (5). The act further provides that all such meetings 
must "be open to the public and all persons shall be permitted to attend 
any meeting except as otherwise provided by this act." I.e. §67-2342(l). 
The act further requires that meetings be preceded by public notice, I.e. 
§67-2343, and that written minutes be taken, I.C. §67_2344. 138 
Here, there was neither a meeting nor a vote to waive the provisions of Section 7.139 
There was no official act by the City Council that could be deemed a waiver. In this regard, the 
Washington Courts, on two separate occasions, have recognized that while a City, acting through 
its City Council, may waive a contract provision in a construction contract, such wavier would 
require proof of unequivocal acts of conduct evidencing an intent by the City Council to 
. 140 
waIve. 
There is simply no conduct that can be attributed to the City that could be considered a 
clear unequivocal intent to waive Petra's mandatory notice and approval requirements of Section 
7 of the CMA. Petra was the entity responsible for submitting the multiple budgets disclosing 
escalating costs while continuing to represent no change to the identified fixed Fee and 
guaranteed Reimbursable Expenses. Petra commenced providing "additional services" with 
respect to the basement on May 7, 2007 some four (4) months before giving what could only 
138 State r. City of Hailey, 102 Idaho 511,513,633 P.2d 576, 578 (1981) 
139 Tr. p. 5977, L. 5 - 16. 
I.JO Absher Constr. Ca. r. Kent Sch. Dis/. :Vo. 415, 77 Wash. A pp. 137, 143, 890 P.2d 1071 (1995); iv/ike AI Johnson, 
Inc. r. CountyafSpokane. 150 Wash.2d 375, 391,78 P.3d 161 (2003). 
-37-
arguably considered as notitication. 141 The City rightfully relied on Petra's representations and 
approved the budget's evidencing no increase in Fee or Reimbursable Expenses. As a matter of 
law, such conduct cannot be considered a waiver by, nor form the basis for estoppel as to the 
City. The DC must be reversed, and Petra's claims dismissed. 
In fact the City asserted waiver as an affirmative defense to Petra's breach of contract 
claim and not only should the DC conclusion that the City waived the enforcement of Section 7 
be reversed, but this Court should conclude that the DC erred as matter of law by failing to rule 
on and enforce this defense of the City.142 In this context, the correct legal conclusion is that 
Petra's failure to comply with Section 7, combined with its affirmative written representations to 
the City, constitute a complete waiver of its claims. It has been recognized in a context similar to 
the instant matter that where a contract provides a mandatory procedure for claims for extra 
work, which provisions are mandatory, a contractor's failure to follow these procedures results in 
waiver of the contractor's c1aim. 143 In this regard, "actual notice is not an exception to contract 
I· " 144 comp lance. 
Petra failed to achieve the express condition precedent, i.e. timely notice, and never 
sought, nor obtained the City's prIor approval for any material change in services prIor to 
allegedly providing those services. What Petra did do however, was repeatedly represent to the 
City that its Fee and Reimbursable Expenses would not change, despite the increase in MCH 
141 Ex. 755, p. 4; Tr. p. 5678, LL. 12-14; Ex. 2148. 
142 R. 8490. 
143 Absher Construction Co. 1". Kent School District No. 415, 890 P.2d 1071, 1073, 1074 (Wa. Ct. App. 1995). 
144 Alike /vI. Johnson. Inc. 1". County olSpokane, 150 Wash.2d 375, 391, 78 P.3d 161, 169 (Wa. 2003). 
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costs. The City relied on Petra's representations. The four 'budgets' 145 and Petra's City Council 
presentation 146 lett no doubt there would be no increase in Petra's Fee or Reimbursable 
Expenses. Petra should be held to their express, affirmative representations to the City, upon 
which the City relied and thereupon approved. 147 The DC's factual and legal conclusions are 
clearly erroneous with respect to Section 7, and the DC's decision must be reversed and 
remanded with dismissal of Petra's claims. 
4. The DC Failed to Apply Section 8 of the CMA to Dismiss Petra's 
Claims. 
Also evident from a review of the DC's Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law is the 
fact that the DC neither considered, nor applied, Section 8 of the CMA. 
Section 8.1 of the CMA provides as follows: 
In the event that any claim, dispute or other matter in question between 
Owner and Construction Manager arising out of or related to this 
Agreement or the breach hereof (a "Claim"), Owner and Construction 
Manager shall first endeavor to resolve the Claim through direct 
discussions. Claims must be initiated by written notice. The 
responsibility to substantiate Claims rests with the party making the claim. 
Except as otherwise agreed in writing, Construction Manager shall 
continue to diligently perform its obligations under this Agreement and 
Owner shall continue to make payments in accordance with this 
Agreement pending the final resolution of any Claim. Construction 
Manager acknowledges that Owner's ability to evaluate a Claim 
depends in large part on Owner being able to timely review the 
circumstances of the Claim. Therefore, Construction Manager agrees 
that it shall submit a Claim to Owner by written notice no later than 
twenty-one (2 J) calendar days after the event or the first appearance of 
the circumstances giving rise to the Claim, and that such written notice 
145 Ex. Nos. 2007, 2183, 2145, 2184. 
I~Ex. 2025, pp.45,46. 
147 Tr. p. 6069, L. 17 - p. 6071, L. 8. 
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shall set j'orth in detail all facts and circumstances supporting the 
Claim. 148 
The DC's legal error In failing to consider or apply the unambiguous application of 
Section 8.1 is clear error. A "claim" is defined as "the aggregate of operative facts giving rise to 
a right enforceable by a court" and "the assertion of any right to payment or to an equitable 
remedy, even if contingent or provisional" and "a demand for money, property or a legal 
remedy".149 
Under each of these three plain language definitions, as of January 15,2007, Petra knew 
or should have known of its claim for an increased fee based upon its percentage of budget 
theory.150 It cannot be rationally disputed that the $15.4 Million Dollar cost estimate, which was 
27% over the CMA's stated budget, is "the event or the first appearance of circumstances giving 
rise to the Claim,,,151 given the nature of Petra's percentage of budget theory. 
Petra knew of every "change" identified by the DC starting as early as January IS, 
2007. 152 Petra fai led to give any notice under Section 8 of the CMA. At best, Petra can argue 
that its November 5, 2007 correspondence 153 might qualify, however, it was woefully untimely. 
Again, where a contract provides a procedure for claims for extra work, which provisions are 
148 Ex. 2003, p. 20, §8.1. (emphasis added). 
149 Black's Diclionwy, 9th Ed. 
150 R. 92. ~~ 55-67; R. 382, ~~ 55-67; Ex. 2007. 
151 Ex. 2007 
152 See. Appendix B. 
153 Ex. 2285 
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mandatory, a contractor's failure to follow these procedures results in waiver of the contractor's 
claim. 154 In this regard, "actual notice is not an exception to contract compliance".155 
The application of Section 8 is of even greater significance given Petra's repeated written 
representations and affirmations that neither it's Fee nor the Reimbursable Expenses would 
increase, despite the escalating cost estimates. 156 The DC's legal error in its failure to consider, 
nor apply, Section 8 of the CMA mandates reversal and dismissal of Petra's claims. 
5. The DC Failed to Apply the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA) to Petra's 
Claims. 
The DC held the ITCA "inapplicable to Petra's contract claim." 157 The filing of a 
compliant tort claims notice is a jurisdictional prerequisite and mandatory condition precedent 
for bringing a cause of action. 158 The ITCA requires that a claimant such as Petra, provide the 
City a compliant tort claims notice within 180 days of when a claim arose or reasonably should 
have been discovered. Coupled with I.e. § 50-219, claims for damages arising under contract 
require the same notice. 159 Petra knew, or should have known, of its claim for an increased fee 
based upon its percentage of budget theori 60 as of January IS, 2007 when it submitted its first 
"budget,,161 exceeding $12.2 Million Dollars. 
154 Absher Construction Co. 1". Kent School District No. 415,77 Wash. App. 137, 142,890 P.2d 1071, 1073, 1074 
(Wa. Ct. App. 1995). 
155 iv/ike M Johnson, Inc. 1". COllnty ol5j)()kane, 150 Wash.2d. 375, 391, 78 P.3d 161, 169 (Wa. 2003) 
156 Ex. Nos. 2007, 2 I 83,2 145, & 2 184. 
157 R. 8263. 
158 i'viadsen v. Idaho Dept. ol Health and Wellare, I 16 Idaho 758,76 I, 779 P.2d 433, 436(Ct. App. 1989). 
159 SlI'eit::er1". Dean. 118 Idaho 568, 572, 798 P.2d 27, 31 (1990). 
160 R. 92, ~~ 55-67; R. 382, ~~ 55-67 
161 Ex. 2007 
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Petra failed to introduce any evidence at trial of the required jurisdictional compliance 
with the [TCA. [n all actions against a governmental entity such as the City here, the party 
asserting a claim must both plead and prove that he or she has complied with the requirements of 
the ITCA. 162 Petra wholly failed to prove that it has complied with the requirements of the ITCA 
and its claim must be dismissed. 163 The DC's legal error in its failure to apply the ITCA to 
Petra's claims mandate a reversal, and order for dismissal of Petra's claims. In parallel, such a 
reversal likewise requires a reversal of the award of attorney fees to Petra. 
B. THE DC COMMITTED CLEAR ERROR BY FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT PETRA 
HAD BREACHED THE CMA. 
The City placed a simple issue before the DC: Petra's performance failed to match its 
unambiguous and express duties under the Contract Documents. As the Construction Manager, 
Petra's only jobs were to comply with state law and to protect the City's interests in every aspect 
of the design and construction of the MCH. Petra was to "inspect" and if necessary, "reject" to 
insure that the work of each contractor met the requirements of the Contract Documents. 
The DC erred as a matter of law, in two respects: First, it erred in failing to apply the law 
of contracts to its own Findings of Fact. Second, it erred as matter of law when it disregarded the 
positive, uncontradicted testimony of credible witnesses. The Idaho Supreme Court has 
uniformly held to this rule. 164 An application of the rule to Petra's express contractual duties 
167 
- POllnds 1'. Dennison, 120 Idaho 425, 427 816 P.2d 982,984 (1991). 
163 Driggers v. Grafe, 148 Idaho 295,297,221 P.3d 521,523 (Ct. App. 2009) (the "failure to comply with the notice 
requirement bars a suit regardless of how legitimate it might be.") 
164 Dinneen 1'. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 626-627, 603 P. 2d 575, 581, 582(1979) 
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demonstrates that Petra unequivocally breached the CMA. The DC's legal errors mandate 
reversal. 
1. The DC Committed Clear Error When It Concluded that Petra Did 
Not Assume a Fiduciary Relationship With the City as a Result of the 
Express Terms of the CMA. 
Before addressing the substance of the DC's errors with regard to both fact and law, one 
significant error of law must be addressed which, upon proper reversal, serves as a part of the 
fabric for the City's claims against Petra. Incorporated with the DC's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law is the DC's determination that despite the presence of express and clear 
contractual language reserved for fiduciary relationships, Petra's relationship with the City was 
"not that of a fiduciary". 165 This conclusion is clear error. 
The CMA, at § 1.1 states: 
1.1 Relationship of the Parties. 
Construction Manager acknowledges and accepts the relationship of 
trust and confidence established with Owner by this Agreement and that 
this relationship is a material consideration for Owner in entering into 
h· A f66 t IS greement. 
The DC found the CMA to be unambiguous. 167 The common use or settled legal 
meanings of the terms "trust and confidence" are those used to describe a relationship, which is 
165 R. 8286, ~ Q. 
166 Ex. 2003, p. 5, § 1.1 "Relationship of the Parties." (emphasis added). 
167 R. 8286, ~ P. 
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fiduciary in nature. 168 Thus. Petra stood in the role of a fiduciary to the City with respect to all 
duties to be performed by it under the Contract Documents. 169 
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained: 
Fiduciary relationships are commonly characterized by one party placing 
property or authority in the hands of another, or being authorized to act on 
behalf of another." Further,[t]he term fiduciary implies that one party is in 
a superior position to the other and that such a position enables him to 
exercise influence over one who reposes special trust and confidence in 
him .... As a general rule, mere respect for another's judgment or trust in 
[his] character is usually not sufficient to establish such a relationship. The 
facts and circumstances must indicate that the one reposing the trust has 
foundation for his belief that the one giving advice or presenting 
arguments is acting not in his own behalf, but in the interests of the other 
l70Wh h fid' I' h' ., . fl 171 party. et er a I uClary re atlOns Ip eXists IS a questIOn 0 aw. 
Accordingly, as a fiduciary Petra was obligated to perform all services to the City 
required under the CMA with the "the utmost good faith, candor, fairness, honor, and fidelity" 
and to "should be held at all times and under all circumstances to the full measure of what he 
ought to do. 172 The DC failed to recognize the existence of this duty, 173 and that conclusion is 
clear error. The consequence of this error is therefore multiplied when the DC not only failed to 
recognize that the omissions by Petra not only breached the express terms of the CMA and 
Contract Documents, but that these omissions were particularly egregious in view of Petra's 
168 See. JJigh Valley Concrete. LLe 1'. 5;argent, 149 Idaho 423, 234 P.3d 747 (20 I 0); Gray v. Tri-Way Const. 
Services, Inc .. 147 Idaho 378, 386, 210 P.3d 63, 71 (2009); i'v1itchell 1'. Barendregt. 120 Idaho 837, 844, 820 P.2d 
707,714 (Ct. App. 1991). 
169 See Sorensen v. Saint "lIphonslis Regional .\1edical Center. Inc., 141 Idaho 754, 765, 118 P.3d 86, 98 (2005) 
(acknowledging that a party to a contract can contractually bind itself to be a fiduciary to the other party to the 
contract.) 
170 Idaho First Nat'! Bank r. Bliss T 'alley Foods. Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 278, 824 P.2d 841, 853 (1991). 
171 Ilayden Lake Fire Protection Dis!. 1'. Alcorn. 141 Idaho 388, 401, III P.3d 73 (2005). 
172 AinslI'orth 1'. Harding, 22 Idaho 645,128 P. 92, 95-96 (1912). 
I7.l R. 8286, ~~ Q & R. 
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fiduciary relationship with the City. 
2. The DC Recognized that Petra Overcharged the City, but Erred 
When It Failed to Recognize the Same as a Breach, and Then 
Awarded Damages on a Speculative and Arbitrary Basis. 
Amongst the errors committed by the DC with regard to its analysis of the City's claims 
against Petra, perhaps the most apparent are the DC's Findings at ~~ 92, 93, 94, and 95. 174 The 
DC expressly found that Petra obtained payment from the City for amounts "not provided for in 
the Construction Management Plan or which exceeded the limits for reimbursables".175 There 
can be no legal conclusion from these factual findings other than that Petra's actions constituted 
a material breach of the CMA. Overcharging the City is, as a matter of fact and law, a material 
breach of Petra's contractual and fiduciary duties.176 Despite this finding, the DC failed to 
conclude that Petra's conduct constituted a material breach of the CMA, but rather simply 
concluded that it to be "inequitable" for Petra to retain those amounts. This constitutes clear 
error warranting reversal. 
The DC then stated that ascertaining the exact amount that Petra overcharged would be 
"exceptionally difficult and time consuming" and thus, without further explanation, simply 
identified $52,000 as the damage amount that the City could collect in offsets against Petra. 177 
The DC fails to point to any evidence, or exhibit from which the $52,000.00 figure is drawn.178 
The DC's finding No. 95 can be regarded as nothing more than guesswork as there are no 
174 R. 8273, ~~ 92 ~ 94. 
175 R. 8273, ~ 92. 
176 Thus, the DC's finding that the City did not prove its breach of contract claim against Petra is clear error. 
See, R. 8285, ~ A. 
177 R. 8273, ~ 93. 
178 R. 8273, ~ 95. 
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combination of numbers presented in the evidence that will add up to precisely $52,000.00. 
There is nothing to do but speculate as to how the DC calculation was made. However, had the 
DC exercised a bit of effort to ascertain the amount, the uncontroverted evidence provides the 
correct answer. 
The DC's action is particularly troublesome in view of the clear evidence presented by 
the City of multiple categories and costs for which Petra "overcharged" the City. Petra provided 
a submittal to the City which contained "General Conditions" for reimbursement 179 that 
contained category descriptions, including one for "weather protection & heating", also known 
as winter conditions. In Petra's CMP document, this category totaled $80,000. 180 The City 
presented expert testimony that, rather than limited to $80,000, the City in fact paid $166,154. 181 
In addition, neither the CMP nor the CMA contained any category for "Job Conditions" 
or "Extra Work Orders".182 The evidence established that Petra improperly billed the City for 
"Job Conditions" in the amount of $57, 076.81 and "Extra Work Orders" in the amount of 
$80,544.95. 183 
These three overcharges, either not provided for or exceeding the limits for such 
reimbursables, total $223,775.76. The DC erred as a matter of law by failing to apply the 
language of the CMA to these undisputed totals taken directly from Petra's accounting records 
for the project. 
179 Ex. 2547, pp. 43 & 47. 
180 Ex. 2547, pp. 43 & 47. 
181 Tr. p. 4697, L. 16 ~ p. 4703, L. 7. 
182 Tr. p. 2492, LL. 8-13; Tr. p. 2564, L. 2 ~ p. 2566, L. 7; Ex. 2003; Ex. 2547, pp. 43 ~ 50. 
183 Ex. 2127, pp. 10-12 & 73-75. 
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The CMA permitted Petra to recover General Conditions only in amounts it actually 
expended 1 84 (subject to the limitations identified by the DC), at Petra's cost thereof. However, 
the evidence demonstrated that Petra improperly submitted a Change Order that was not based 
on any amount it actually expended, but rather a charge based purely upon a percentage of other 
costs incurred by third parties. This evidence is found in Petra's Change Order No. 1. 185 Change 
Order No.1 sought $11,314.00 186 for what Petra described as "1 extra month of services due to 
unforeseen conditions ... LS (sic Lump Sum)." 187 Thus, Petra intentionally disregarded the 
requirement that General Conditions Reimbursables be related to payment for amounts actually 
expended and Petra nonetheless improperly charged a lump sum percentage fee to the City that 
had no relation to an amount actually, or ever expended. 
There are more overcharges by Petra. The DC ignored Petra billing the City for Petra's 
home office natural gas bill. Under the CMA, Petra's fixed "Fee" included all "overhead, profit, 
home office expenses ... ,,188 Petra saw fit to bill the City, and get paid for, its own home office's 
Intermountain Gas bill in the amount of $1,436.84. 189 Meridian City Hall's address is 33 E. 
Broadway, Meridian, Id. 190 
184 Ex. 2003, p. 19, §6.2.3. 
185 Ex. 228 I. 
186 Ex. 228 I, p. 2, Item No. 0004. 
187 Ex. 2281, p. 2, Item No. 0004. 
188Ex.2003,pp. 17, 18,§6.J. 
189 Ex. 2074, p. 6 I; Tr. p. 2683, L. 2 I - p. 2684, L. 10. 
190 Ex. 2074, P. 60; Tr. p. 2682, L. 22 - p. 2683, L. 10. 
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With respect to each of these additional overcharges, the DC had a duty to apply the 
unambiguous contract duties to the uncontested facts. As a matter of law, the DC erred by failing 
to find Petra in material breach when applying the appropriate contract principles. 
3. The DC Erred When It Failed to Find that Petra Breached the CMA 
by Charging the City for Costs Associated With Its Own Negligence 
and the Negligence of Others. 
In addition to substantial overcharges that were either overlooked or ignored by the DC in 
its arbitrary selection of damages to be awarded to the City, the DC also ignored the unrebutted 
evidence that Petra also charged the City for damages to the MCH caused by Petra and other 
Prime Contractors. 
The City Hall is designed with 'access floor panels', which is an elevated system sitting 
above the concrete flooring on each floor of the structure. These floor panels can be removed to 
allow 'access' to the space between the concrete floor and the elevated floor panels. As a result 
of Petra's poor construction coordination,191 flooring was installed in areas where other work, 
such as plumbing and electrical work, had not yet been completed. Consequently, the plumbing 
and electrical workers removed the access floor panels, damaging them in the process. Bennett, 
as part of Petra's pay appl ication process, 192 reviewed and approved the repair billings submitted 
by the access floor contractor which clearly evidenced the bills were for "damage caused by 
others". 193 In fact, Bennett authorized $71,000 of payments to the access floor contractor in 
]9] Tr. p. 1783, L. 18 - p. 1785, L. 14. 
]92 Ex. 20 I 7, p. 39, §9.3. I. 
]93 Tr. p. 1763, L. 2 - p. 1764, L. 24; Tr. p. 1777, L. 23 - p. 1778, L. 14; Tr. p. 1779, L. 6 p. 1780, L. 19; 
Ex. 2661, pp. 10, 12, and 13; Ex. 2097, pp. 127 & 125. 
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excess of its stated contract value, without a single Change Order being submitted for City 
. d I 194 revIew an approva. 
Even more egregiously, the evidence established that Petra charged the City for its own 
errors. A Petra superintendent selected the wrong benchmark, or elevation, for the installation of 
the access flooring. 195 The CMA unambiguously states that Petra agreed to indemnify the City 
for its own errors. l96 Instead of acknowledging this error, and paying for the error itself, Petra 
instead chose to submit the bill in the amount of$4,537.50 to the City for payment. 197 
With respect to each of these charges, the DC erred in ignoring the evidence presented, 
finding Petra in breach of the CMA and awarding damages in the amount of$75,537.50 
4. The DC Committed Clear Error When It Failed to Find that Petra 
Materially Breached Its Agreement With the City by Failing to 
Obtain Payment and Performance Bonds. 
Petra contractually agreed to comply with alllaws. 198 Idaho Code §54-4512 provides that 
any licensed CM or firm providing public works construction management services shall post 
payment and performance bonds. 199 There are no exceptions. 2oo Despite these clear statutory 
and contractual mandates, Petra failed to obtain performance and payment bonds for the 
construction of the project. It is no exaggeration to say that the series of Petra's violations of its 
contractual and fiduciary duty and breaches of the CMA, commenced from the very first act it 
undertook, or failed to undertake, with regard to the MCH. The DC's finding that the City 
194 Tr.p.1810,L.22-p.1811,L.25. 
195 Tr. p. 7595, L. 19 p. 7596, L. 19; Ex. 2059. 
196 Ex. 2003, p. 8, §2.8 
197 Ex. 2059. 
198 Ex. 2003, p. 8, §2.7. 
199 Idaho Code §54-4512. 
200 Vienna iv/elro LLC v. PlI/le Home COIp .. 786 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1081-82 (E.D. Va. 20 II). 
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somehow could excuse Petra' s statutory duty is clearly erroneous as a matter of law?OI Of 
greater import, is that the damages now suffered by the City may not be collectable as a result of 
Petra's failure to obtain the required bonds. 
5. The DC Committed Clear Error When It Failed to Conclude that 
Petra Materially Breached the CMA by Not Fulfilling the 
Contractually Required Substantial Completion Process. 
Under the CMA, Petra was required to "do all things, or when appropriate, require 
Architect ... to do all things necessary, appropriate or convenient to achieve the end result desired 
by Owner. .. ,,202 In the Contract Documents, specifically the A-20 lICMa General Conditions for 
everyone of the fifty two (52) Prime Contracts, the expressly defined process for "substantial 
completion" and "final completion" was critical to achieving the City's desired "first class 
result".203 Petra and the Architect LCA, each had the express, affirmative duty to certify in 
writing when the work under each of the 52 contracts, was sufficiently complete in accordance 
with the Contract Documents?04 This process required two separate inspections, by Petra and 
20-LCA, and not others. ) 
201 "Contracts to do acts forbidden by law are void and cannot be enforced. Tiffany v. Boalman's Sal'. Insl., 85 U.S. 
(18 Wall.) 375, 384, 21 L.Ed. 868, 869 (1873); Harris v. Runnels. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 79, 83, 13 L.Ed. 901, 903 
(1851). Generally, a contract "which is made for the purpose of furthering any matter or thing prohibited by statute 
... is void. This rule applies to every contract which is founded on a transaction l11a/ul11 in se, or which is prohibited 
by statute, on the ground of public policy." Parler 1'. Canyon County Farmers' ,'vilit. Fire Ins. Co., 45 Idaho 522, 
525, 263 P. 632, 633 (1928), citing Slt'Gnger 1'. Jlaybeny. 59 Cal. 91, 94, 1881 WL 1766 (Cal. July Term 1881)" 
Kunz v. Lobo Lodge, Inc, 133 Idaho 608, 611, 990 P.2d 1219, 1222 (Ct. App. 1999) 
202 Ex. 2003, p. 11, §4.1. (emphasis added) 
203 Ex. 2017, p. 21, §3.5, p. 42, §9.8. 
204 Ex. 2017, p. 42, §9.8.1. (emphasis added) 
205 Ex. 2017, p. 38, §8.1.3 & p. 42, §9.8. 
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The DC, in finding No. 71 states: "Petra asked LCA to issue ~ certificate of substantial 
completion, but LCA did not do SO.,,206 The DC's legal error here is objectively manifest: The 
undisputed evidence is that not a single Certificate of Substantial Completion was issued for any 
Prime Contract.207 The DC disregarded Petra's express duty to "do all things" and Petra's 
express duty to "certify in writing" that each Prime Contractor's work complied with the 
requirements of the Contract Documents. 208 The undisputed fact is that neither Petra, nor LCA as 
the Architect, ever certified in writing that any of the work of any of the 52 Prime Contracts met 
the requirements of the Contract Documents. 
Further, what did Petra do after LCA failed to issue a single certificate of substantial 
completion? The answer is Petra did nothing, nor did they advise the City they weren't going to 
do anything. One might ask which one of the 52 required certificates of substantial completion, 
for which Prime Contractor, did Petra ask LCA to issue? What is clear from these rhetorical 
questions, and the DC finding, is that the DC erred as a matter of law in both recognition, and 
interpretation of the express substantial completion contractual duties, and the application to the 
undisputed fact that those duties were disregarded by Petra. Nor did the DC interpret the plain 
language of the A-20 I ICMa contracts to recognize that without the required dual inspection and 
the written certification, the contractor's work was not complete. As Petra's witness Coughlin 
testified, the Certificate's importance in identifying when the work is complete, when the 
206 R. 8270, ~ 71. (emphasis added) 
207 Tr. p. 7320, L. 17 p. 7321, L. I; Tr. p. 8904, L. 4 - 9. 
208 The "Contract Documents" included all Drawings, Specifications, and the General Conditions for the Project. 
Ex. 2017, p. 15, § 1.1. 1. 
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warranty will commence, and when the Owner accepts the work, cannot be dismissed. 209 
Without the work complete, the issuance of the warranty was meaningless.2IO 
The Certificate of Substantial Completion and its written acceptance by the City and the 
Prime Contractors, is a critical demarcation line. The DC's holding is akin to Petra saying that 
only 12 the building was constructed, but anything not done would be covered under the 
warranty. This nai"ve notion is legal error which fails to recognize that the express language of 
the warranty only applies to repair workmanship, or materials that were actually fully and 
properly provided In the first instance.211 Hence Petra's express duty to inspect and reject 
nonconforming work. 
The trial record evidences that Petra did nothing to fulfill either its, or LCA' s, express 
obligation to insure and certify in writing to the City that the work complied with the Contract 
Documents. As a result, the City was left with myriad failures, which the DC erred as a matter 
of law in failing to consider.212 For example, in Finding No. 166, the DC expressly found "[a] 
missing closure strip and inadequate caulking in the area of the Mayor's suite and reception area 
allowed air, water and insects to enter the interior of the building.,,213 The only legal conclusion 
from this Finding is that the contractor's work never "complied with the requirements of the 
209 Tr. p. 8786, L. 9 - p. 8788, L. 3. 
210 Ex. 2017, p. 21, §3.5.1. 
211 Ex. 2017, p. 21, §3.5.1. 
212 The DC simply chose to ignore the Petra's failure to reject non-conforming work, and Petra's failure to perform 
the work necessary to require LCA and the Contractors to do their work for compliance with the Contract 
Documents. 
213 Ex. 2195, pp. 2, 5, 7,19,25 & 30. 
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Contract Documents.,,21.! Further, the only conclusion is that Petra failed to inspect and reject the 
contractors' work. The DC's legal error again arises from the unambiguous express contract 
language. 
clear: 
Petra's contractual obligation of inspection for defective and deficient work was crystal 
4.7.9 Construction Manager shall carefully observe the Work of each 
Contractor whenever and wherever necessary, and shall, at a minimum, 
observe Work at the project site no less frequently than each standard 
workday. The purpose of such observations shall be to determine the 
quality and quantity of the Work in comparison with the 
requirements of the Construction Contract. In making such 
observations, Construction Manager shall protect Owner from 
continuing deficient or defective Work, from continuing unexcused 
delays in the schedule, and from overpayment to a Contractor. Following 
each observation, Construction Manager shall submit a written report of 
such observation to Owner and Architect together with any appropriate 
comments or recommendations. 
4.7.10 Construction Manager shall reject, in writing, any Work of a 
Contractor that is not in compliance with the Construction 
Documents unless otherwise directed by Owner in writing.215 
Contrary to the DC's apparent conclusion that Petra only had to inspect daily if it was 
"readily accessible.,,216 Petra's contractual duty was to inspect "whenever and wherever 
necessary", not 'whenever and wherever convenient'. The DC's failure to hold Petra to its 
contractually obligated duties is clear legal error requiring a finding of breach which arises 
214 The "Contract Documents" included all Drawings, Specifications, and the General Conditions for the Project. 
Ex. 2017, p. 15, §1.1.1. 
215 Ex. 2003, p. 16, §§4.7.9 & 4.7.10. (emphasis added). 
216 R. 8281, ~ 166. 
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directly from the Findings made by the DC. If any of the work of the Prime Contractors was 
never complete, then the City failed to receive what it bargained for from Petra. 
6. The DC Committed Clear Error When It Failed to Conclude that 
Petra Breached the CMA by Failing to Properly Administer the 
Prime Contracts. 
The DC expressly found: "TMC, Inc., the masonry contractor, received a $40,000 
overpayment due to Petra's failure to attribute that sum to TMC's budget. Instead, it was 
approved for payment by Petra from the project's winter conditions budget.,,217 
TMC's A-IOl/CMa Contract contained an express provision for a $40,000 allowance for 
winter conditions. 218 TMC was thus contractually required to provide winter conditions 
protection to its work on the jobsite, without additional payment over and above its contract 
amount. 
Pursuant to the A-201lCMa for TMC,219 TMC was required to submit to Petra a schedule 
of values, including allowances, for review by Petra, for Petra "to substantiate its accuracy" as 
part of Petra's express contractual duties.22oApplications for payment were then submitted to 
Petra who was to determine whether or not payment was appropriate by way of a Certificate for 
Payment.221 Petra, pursuant to both the CMA and the A-20 1/CMa, had an affirmative duty to 
protect the interests of the City.222 Petra had an express duty to examine the TMC schedule of 
217 R. 8274, ~ 99. 
218 Ex. 2018, p. 3, §3.2 
219Ex.2017,p.39,§§9.2.1 &9.3.1. 
220 Ex. 2017, p. 39, §9.2.1; Ex. 2003, p. 16, §4.7.7. 
221 Tr. p. 6142, L. 3 - p. 6149, L. 14; Ex. 2017, p. 28, §4.6.8. 
222 "The issuance of a separate Certificate for Payment. .. will constitute representations made separately by the 
Construction Manager. .. to the Owner, based upon ... individual observations at the site and the data 
comprising the Application for Payment submitted by the Contractor, that the Work has progressed to the 
-54-
values for conformity with its contract.223 TMCs schedule of values failed to contain the 
$40,000 allowance for winter conditions contained in its A-I 0 IICMa Contract. As the DC found 
this was a "substantial error" by Petra.n1 However, the DC erred as a matter of law, by 
creating a new legal standard for contracts, when it notes that Petra's substantial error was "not 
intended to deceive.,,225 In the context of breach of contract standards, as a matter of law, intent 
to deceive is irrelevant. Petra materially breached its express contractual and fiduciary duties and 
the DC's failure to so conclude is reversible legal error. 
Petra expressly agreed to be fully responsible for its failures: 
2.1.5. Construction Manager assumes full responsibility to Owner for its 
own improper acts andlor omissions and those employed or 
retained by Construction Manager in connection with the project 
(excluding intentional acts), but not for acts and omissions 
expressly directed by Owner.226 
As an error in law, the DC reads an 'intent to deceive' element into the clear, 
unambiguous language of §2.1.5. The DC is legally incorrect, and the DC finding of "substantial 
error" as a matter of fact, requires the legal conclusion that Petra materially breached both its 
contractual and fiduciary duties to the City, and the damage suffered is clearly defined by the DC 
finding as to the $40,000.00. 
point indicated, and that, to the best of the Construction Manager's knowledge, information and belief, 
quality ofthe Work for conformance with the Contract Documents." 
See, Ex. 2017, p. 40, §9.4.3; See also, Ex. 2003, p. 16, §4.7.7. (emphasis added). 
223 Ex. 2017, p. 39, §9.2.1. 
224 R. 8274, ~ 10 I. (emphasis added). 
225 R. 8274, ~ 101. 
226 Ex. 2003, p. 7, §2.I.S. (emphasis added). 
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7. The DC Committed Clear Error When It Failed to Conclude that 
Petra Materially Breached Its Contractual Duty by Failing to Advise 
the City as to Liquidated Damages. 
At Finding No. 29, the DC appropriately finds that Petra is the City's "agent" with 
respect to each of the 52 Prime Contracts.227 As the City's agent, as a matter of law, Petra had a 
duty to enforce all provisions of each Prime Contract, including the liquidated damages 
•. 228 provIsIons. 
Each of the 52 Prime Contracts established a different date for "Substantial Completion," 
but each contained the same liquidated damages provision, under which the City was entitled to 
$500.00 per day of non-completion beyond the established date. Petra had a duty as the City's 
agent, and an express contractual dut/29 to advise the City when the I iquidated damages 
provision had been triggered. But with one exception, Rule Steel, instead of advising the City 
that it was entitled to liquidated damages due to significant delays by contractors, Petra prepared 
and presented for City Council approval Change Orders improperly extending the contractors' 
deadlines. The DC erred as a matter of law in its interpretation of Petra's contractual and 
fiduciary duty to advise the City when the Prime Contractors failed to meet their contractual 
deadlines. 
The DC found that an oral agreement of unknown date, between LCA, the City and Petra 
established a "unified date" of substantial completion,230 by which oral agreement the City 
m Ex. 2003, p. 5, §I.I. 
228 Ex. 2003, p. 5, § 1.1. 
229 Ex. 2003, p. 5, § 1.1. 
230 R. 8270, ~ 69. 
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purportedly waived its right to liquidated damages?31 This finding was in error because the 
dates for substantial completion for each of the 52 Prime Contracts were contained in written 
contracts between the City and each Contractor, and could not be changed by any agreement, 
whether oral or written, between the City and LCA or Petra, who were neither parties to the 
Prime Contracts, nor agents of the Prime Contractors. Further, the Prime Contracts each 
required that any modification of the contract be in writing and executed by the parties.232 For 
these reasons, the DC's finding that the Prime Contracts' Substantial Completion dates were 
extended by oral agreement is clearly erroneous as a matter of law. 
Petra's breach of its duty to inform the City of delays, and the DC's erroneous 
substitution of the "unified" deadline for the contractual deadlines, works a grave hardship on the 
City. For example, Western Roofing's contract called for its work to be Substantially Complete 
on November 23, 2007.233 By Change Order signed by Petra on September 25, 2008234 
without the contractually required "claim for additional time" by Western,235 and without 
advising the City as to the delay or the rights the City would be waiving, Petra recommended a 
Change Order extending Western's "Substantial Completion" date from November 23, 2007 to 
August 28, 2008.236 By its actions, Petra gave Western an additional two hundred seventy-nine 
231 The City maintains that the DC finding is an error oflaw, in that the Contract Documents between the City and 
the Prime Contractors, as they relate to Substantial Completion, require that any modification be made in writing, 
signed by those two parties. Ex. 2017, p. IS, § 1.1.1. 
232 Ex. 2017, p. 15. §l.l.l. 
233 Ex. 2014, p. 2, §3.1. 
234 Ex. 21 08. 
235 Tr. p. 7952, LL. 20 - 25. 
D6Ex.2014,p.2;Ex.2108. 
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(279) days of relief from its contractual date of "Substantial Completion" and deprived the City 
of$139,500.00 in liquidated damages. 
The City quantified, by way of expert testimony, the damage suffered by the City as a 
result of Petra's breaches as to liquidated damages. The amount of damage suffered by the City 
is the sum of $1 ,650,000.00 as a direct result of Petra's conduct.237 
8. The DC Committed Clear Error When It Failed to Conclude that 
Petra Materially Breached the CMA by Failing to Meet the Project 
Schedule. 
Time was of the essence as to Petra's performance of its duties: 
5.1 Schedule of Performance. 
Construction Manager shall commence the performance of its obligations 
under this Agreement upon Owner's notice to proceed and shall diligently 
and expeditiously continue its performance in accordance with the project 
Schedule until all services hereunder have been fully completed. The time 
limits established by the Project Schedule are of the essence and shall 
not be exceeded by Construction Manager .... 238 
If a contract makes timely performance essential, a failure to timely perform can be a 
material breach.239 Additionally, the term "shall" is mandatory in nature?40 
The CMA provided for two phases: pre-construction services to be completed in 6 
months, and construction services to be completed in 18 months. Petra clearly understood the 
intent and meaning of the contract, and anticipated the MCH would be complete by July 31, 
2008, as is reflected in a Petra prepared preliminary project schedule "for the design and 
237 Ex. 2792A; Tr. p. 4680, L. 20 p. 4681, L. 25; Tr. p. 4693, L. lOp. 4694, L. 6. 
238 See, Ex. 2003, p. 17, §5.1 (emphasis added) 
239 United Slates ex reI. Virginia Beach lv/echo c"'en·s., Inc. 1'. 5:1 "ICO CanstI'. Co, 39 F.Supp.2d 661, 672 
(ED.Va.1999). 
240 Vienna lyietro LLC 1'. Pulte flame Corp., 786 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1081-82 (E.D. Va. 2011 ) (quoting Trumbal! In1's. 
Ltd 1'. Wacho1'ia Bank, NA, 436 F.3d 443, 447 (4th Cir.2006)). 
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construction of the project"?4! The preparation of this schedule was required by the CMA.242 
Thus, Petra acknowledged that all the enumerated pre-construction services were to be 
24' 
completed by February 1,2007. ) 
Petra was in material breach of the Preconstruction Phase Services requirements as of 
February 2, 2007. Building construction should have commenced on February 2, 2007. 
According to the uncontradicted testimony of Bennett, and as reflected on Ex. 755, construction 
of the building did not commence until May 7, 2007, more than three months late. 
Petra's failure to perform on the front end of the project caused the delay on the back end 
of the project. Instead of move in on July 31, 2008, as the City and Petra had agreed,244 move in 
occurred on October 15, 2008 a delay of 78 days?45 Even with a one-month extension for 
. d '1 246.- d' I F b d b P' . . d d contamInate SOl s, loun In ear y e ruary as note y etra s meetIng mInutes ate 
February 12, 2007,247 Petra was late in preconstruction services, and late in delivering the 
building. 
The DC erred as a matter of law, by failing to apply the time is of the essence standard to 
Petra's incontrovertible material breach of the CMA. 
241 Ex. 2267, p. 17. 
242 Ex. 2003, p. 11, §4.2 
243 Ex. 2267, p. 17. 
244 Ex. 2267, p. 17 
245 Tr. p. 4209, LL. 6-9. 
246 Ex. 2281, p. 2, Item 00004; Tr. p. 5679, LL. 4-16. 
247 Ex. 2136, p. 15, Item 00004. 
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9. The DC Committed Clear Error When It Failed to Conclude that 
Petra Materially Breached the CMA by Failing to Require the Key 
Submittals for the Water Features. 
Within its findings, the DC acknowledged that there were multiple failures with the water 
features which were installed as part of the MCH,248 but wholly ignored the evidence of other 
substantial failures such as the fact that the feature was leaking in excess of 5000 gallons of 
water per day when operated.249. Despite these acknowledgements and evidence, the DC 
dismissed the City's claims against Petra with the assertion that all such failures were design, not 
construction flaws. 250 However, the DC conclusion does not recognize that the CMA expressly 
required Petra to examine and approve all submittals, which submittals were critical with regard 
to the water feature.25I 
The submittal process was critical to insure that the City would receive from the Prime 
Contractors, precisely what was called for in the Contract Documents.252 According to Bennett, a 
failure to comply with plans and specifications rendered the work both defective and deficient.253 
Petra's contractual obligation required that Petra "shall protect Owner from continuing deficient 
or defective Work,,,254 and "shall reject, in writing, any Work of any Contractor that is not in 
compliance with the Construction Documents ... ,,255 It is only common sense, that if the 
submittals were necessary to achieve compliance with the Contract Documents, a failure to 
248 R. 8278, ~~ 137 & 138. 
249 Tr. p. 8531, LL. 8-21. 
250 R. 8278, ~ 137. 
251 Ex. 2003, p. 16, §4.7.8. 
252 Ex. 2017, p. 21, §3.5.1, "First Class Result;" Tr. p. 4228, L. 2 - p. 4230, L. 21; Tr. p. 4245, L. 12 - p. 4246, L. 8; 
Tr. p. 4554, L. 23 - p. 4556, L. 24; Tr. p. n08, L. 20 - p. n09, L. 5. 
253 Tr. p. 6029, L. 14-25. 
254 Ex. 2003, p. 16, §4.7.9 
255 Ex. 2003, p. 16, §4.7.10 
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obtain submittals against which the quality of the work was to be judged would be a material 
breach of Petra's express contractual duties. 
The Contract Documents for the water features specifically required that "complete shop 
drawings shall be required for approval prior to installation illustrating piping schematic, 
complete materials schedule, and hydraulic calculations.,,256 Further, the Contract Documents 
required pressure testing of the system prior to acceptance and c1oseout.257 In addition, the 
Contract Documents required that any alternative design plans be "sealed" by the appropriate 
design professional for any major product or material substitutions. 258 As to all of these 
documents, it was, and remains, undisputed that these documents do not exist.259 As is therefore 
obvious, Petra failed to require that the necessary submittals be conveyed to it for its review and 
approval prior to the construction of the water features .. Moreover, the water feature system was 
not intended to leak, and required post-construction pressure testing to demonstrate that it was 
leak proof.26o There were no post-construction pressure testing records. Petra failed to require the 
pressure testing261 and failed to inspect and reject the work. 
Petra failed in the performance of its duties, and in enforcing these requirements.262 The 
DC acknowledged the design error, but as a matter of law, failed to assign responsibility to Petra 
for its undisputed failure to do its job. The DC committed clear error in this regard, its 
256 Ex. 2159, p. 449, "NOTES"; Tr. p. 691, L. 9 ~ p. 693, L. 12; ,)'ee, Appendix C. 
257 Ex. 2154 p. 125, §3.2(D) 
258 Ex. 2154, p. 124, ~ C. 
259 Tr. p. 691, L. 9 - p. 693, L. 12. 
260 Tr. p. 8513, L. 21 -po 8514, L. 5. 
261 Ex. 2934; Tr. p. 8518, L. 20 - p. 8519, L. 14 
262 Tr. p. 4294, L. 12-25; Ex. 2017, p. 25, §3.12.6 
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conclusions should be reversed, and the City should be entitled to an award of damages 
presented at trial in the amount of $315,000?63 
10. Petra Breached the CMA by Failing to Require Demonstrated 
Performance of the HV AC System to Meet All Specification 
Performance Standards. 
A similar conclusion is appropriate with regard to the DC treatment of the City's claims 
for damages resulting from Petra's breach of the CMA as it concerns the HVAC system. As was 
the case with the water features, the DC acknowledged multiple failures and defects with the 
HVAC system, but dismissed any liability as to Petra by assigning liability to various other third 
parties.264 The record demonstrates it was Petra's responsibility to have obtained, reviewed, and 
approved submittals demonstrating the HV AC system met all performance requirements. Petra 
failed in this task. Thus, the DC's findings as to the HVAC issue are clearly erroneous. 
Petra was required to obtain a Test Adjust and Balance ("TAB") Report as required by 
the specifications contained in the Contract Documents.265 The evidence demonstrated that the 
"Preliminary TAB" report prepared by Hobson Fabricating showed major performance flaws in 
the HVAC system, that were never verified by testing as ever having been corrected?66 A careful 
review of the test data contained in the Prel iminary TAB report, when compared to the 
specifications for performance tolerances, reveals that only 31 % (360 of 1,163 tests) actually 
263 Tr. p. 790, L. 19-25. 
264 R. 8277, ~~ 125 & 126. 
265 Ex. 2153, P. 64, §1.3(A)(8) (9). 
266 Tr. p. 7011, L. 7-19; Ex. 2155, pp. 1- 8. 
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passed the performance testing requirements. 267 In fact, the individual performing the 
commlsslonmg admitted at trial that the Preliminary TAB report evidenced that the HV AC 
system never met the performance requirements of the specifications. 268 When the 
commissioning agent asked for a Final TAB Report, he was supplied with the exact same 
preliminary report, with nothing but a different cover page. 269 The so called "Final" report, 
remained unchanged, and continued to evidence all of the original performance failures of the 
HV AC system exactly as identified in the original "Preliminary" report.270 This evidence clearly 
established Petra's material failure to obtain, review and approve the TAB Report submittal, 
demonstrating actual operating compliance with the performance criteria. Petra wholly failed this 
responsibility with respect to the HV ACITAB performance requirements.27I 
The DC erred as a matter of law in its failure to apply the language of express duty to the 
uncontroverted and documented failure of Petra to perform its duties. The DC committed clear 
error in this regard; its conclusions should be reversed. 
267 Ex. 2153 p. 282, §3.16(A)(I) (4) to be used as a standard to judge the TAB test report data contained in 
Ex. 2804. 
268 Tr.p.5112,L.12 p.5116,L.6;Tr.p.5137,L.19-p.5172,L.18. 
269 Tr. p. 5110, L. I - p. 5111, L. 2; Ex. 2797. 
270 Tr. p. 5112, L. 12 p. 5115, L. 14; Ex. 2155; Ex. 2804; Tr. p. 5121, L. 25 p. 5122, L. 8; 
Ex. 2804A,Tr. p. 5123, L.6 p.5174,L.18. 
271 Ex. 2003, p. 16, §4.7.1 O. "4.7.10 Construction Manager shall reject, in writing, any Work of a Contractor that is 
not in compliance with the Construction Documents unless otherwise directed by Owner in writing." 
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11. The DC Committed Clear Error When it Disregarded Multiple 
Incidents of Petra's Failure to Inspect and Reject Deficient and 
Defective Work, Each Constituting a Material Breach. 
a. The Work of TMC was Defective and Deficient and Petra Failed 
to Inspect and Reject TMC's Work. 
The DC's own Findings demonstrate that TMCs work was defective and deficient. 
TMC, the masonry contractor, was to install a system of flashing (external metal covers) to 
provide a weather tight seal.272 TMC completely failed to install the metal flashing on either side 
of the building.273 As a result, the MCH has a more than 20' opening on both the front and rear 
building faces that as of the date of trial, was totally exposed to weather, insects, and intrusions. 
Thus, the DC's finding that "all other aspects of the masonry contractor's work were performed 
according to the plans and specifications,,274 is clearly erroneous. This and other glaring errors 
were acknowledged by Petra's own witnesses.275 
The DC again erred, when it failed to recognize Petra's obligation to inspect and reject 
TMC's failed workmanship, despite finding that "TMCs work on the cast stone masonry was 
flawed in some places that the alignment was outside of the tolerances in the project's plans and 
specifications.,,276 The City presented unrebutted testimonial and photographic evidence of not 
just "some places", but multiple instances of deficient and defective workmanship.277 The DC 
272 See, Appendix A, p.2. 
273 Tr. p. 7990, LL. 4 15. 
274 R. 8275, ~ 109. 
275 Tr. p. 8845, L. 22 p. 8451, L. 13; Ex. 2194, p. 3; Tr. p. 9719, L. 11 - p. 9721, L. 12; Ex. 2680, p. 6; 
Tr. p. 9724, L. 15 - 25; Tr. p. 9723, L. 23 p. 9724, L. 5; Tr. p. 9725, L. 1 - p. 9726, L. 14; Ex. 2194, p. 11 & 30; 
Ex. 2198, p. 11; Ex. 2680, p. 4-6, 8, 14 & 16; Also see. Appendix D. 
276 R. 8274, ~ 104. 
277Ex.2194,pp.4-6,8-11, 13-15,18-19,21-26,30,33; 
Ex. 2680, p. 1, 2, 4-6, 8-14, 16, 17, 19-25, 27, 30, 32, 35, 38-44,46,48-49; Also see. Appendix E. 
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found that the external masonry work contains flaws in workmanship?78 that the masonry had 
missing grout, did not conform to the plans and specifications, and had misaligned stonework.279 
The DC's finding that the work was accepted by LCA, despite its patent and obvious flaws, did 
nothing to relieve Petra of Petra's obligation to inspect and reject the defective and deficient 
work, remembering Petra was to "do all things, or when appropriate, require Architect and each 
Contractor to do all things necessary, appropriate or convenient to achieve the end result desired 
by the Owner. ,,280 The DC legally erred, when it failed to apply Petra's unambiguous duties to 
the DC's findings as to TMC's deficient and defective work. 
This error requires that the DC Finding No. 105,281 be held clearly erroneous as the 
evidence from which it was deduced is inadmissible, as a matter of law, to alter or interpret the 
unambiguous contract specifications.282 As such, the City's expert witness testimony, an expert 
who actually measured the stone work for compliance, stands as the only credible evidence from 
which the Court could draw its findings, and such evidence cannot be rejected by the DC.283 The 
City's expert measured TMC's work and found it to fail to meet the contractually required 
tolerances of the Contract Documents.284 
278 R. 8274 ~ 104. 
279 R. 8275, ~~ 106, 107, and 108. 
280 Ex. 2003, p. 11, §4.2. 
281 R. 8274, ~ 105. 
282 Kimbrough v. Reed. 130 Idaho 512,515, 943 P.2d 1232, 1235 (1997). 
283 Tr. p. 3591, L. 3 -po 3614, L. 6; Ex. 2194, p. 15, 18-19,21-26,30; 
Ex. 2680, p. 1,2,4-6,8-14,16,17,19-25,27,30,32,35,38-44,46,48-49; 
Tr. p. 3670, L. 25 - Tr. 3671, L. 9; See, Appendix F. 
284 Tr. p. 3538, L. 6 p. 3543, L. 2; Tr. p. 3561, L. 10 - p. 3563, L. 1; Tr. p. 3568 L. 22 - p. 3571, L. 5; 
Tr. p. 3573, L. 10 - p. 3580, L. 3; Tr. p. 3581, L. 5 - p. 3587, L. 14; Tr. p. 3592, L. II - p. 3593, L. 19; 
Tr. p. 3596, L. 13 - p. 3599, L. 25. 
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I. The DC Erred in Admitting and Relying Upon Untimely and 
Undisclosed Expert Testimony 
The DC ignored the substantial evidence of defects based upon the testimony of 
McGourty, who was not a timely disclosed witness,285 let alone as an expert,286 and none of the 
expert opinion testimony had been disclosed to the City prior to trial. 
Whether to exclude undisclosed expert testimony pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(e)(4) is 
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.287 The test for determining whether a district 
court abused its discretion is: (1) whether the court correctly perceived that the issue was one of 
discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and 
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) 
whether it reached its decision by an exercise ofreason.288 
With respect to McGourty, Petra never disclosed him as having any factual knowledge in 
either its initial Response to City Interrogatories or by way of any supplementation.289 The DC, 
by way of its Orders imposed a deadline of October 17,2010 for the disclosure of witnesses, a 
deadline that the DC strictly enforced as against the City with respect to a proposed expert 
witness.29o McGourty was not disclosed until October 29, 20 I 0 after the Court's disclosure 
cutoff, and after discovery in the case was closed.291 As a result, the City did not have the 
285 Tr. p. 7448, LL. 16 - 21; Tr. p. 7450, L. 16 - p. 7452, L. 13; R. 628 - 633; R. 6977 - 6980. 
286 See, R. 4879; R. 6358; R. 6684; R. 7077. 
287 Viehweg v. Thompson, 103 Idaho 265, 271,647 P.2d 311, 317 (Ct.App.1982) (citing .'vialler of Webber's ESlale, 
97 Idaho 703, 707-08, 551 P.2d 1339, 1343-44 (1976». 
288 Sun Valley Shopping Center inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). 
289 Tr. p. 7448, LL. 16 21; Tr. p. 7450, L. 16 - p. 7452, L. 13; R. 628 - 633; R. 6977 - 6980. 
290 Tr. p. 31, LL. 4 - 20; See also Tr. p. 2, LL. 12 - 17 (Petra's counsel referencing the September 27, 20 I 0 hearing 
date and the Court's order thereof); September 27, 2010 Hearing Tr. p. 52, L. 12 - p. 55, L. 18. 
291 Tr. p. 7447, L. I p. 7458: L. 2. 
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opportunity to depose McGourty either as a lay witness or purported expert (undisclosed) 
witness before trial.292 
This untimely disclosure and failure to supplement are significant for as this Court 
recognized in Radmer v. Ford Motor Co. 120 Idaho 86, 89, 813 P.2d 897, 900 (1991): 
"In cases [involving expert testimony], a prohibition against discovery of 
information held by expert witnesses produces in acute form the very 
evils that discovery has been created to prevent. Effective cross-
examination of an expert witness requires advance preparation .... 
Similarly, effective rebuttal requires advance knowledge of the line of 
testimony of the other side. If the latter is foreclosed by a rule against 
discovery, the narrowing of issues and elimination of surprise which 
discovery normally produces are frustrated. Id. (quoting Fed. Rule Civ. P. 
26 advisory committee's note). 
Finally, we recognized that: It is fundamental that opportunity be 
had for full cross-examination, and this cannot be done properly in many 
cases without resort to pretrial discovery, particularly when expert 
witnesses are involved .... Before an attorney can even hope to deal on 
cross-examination with an unfavorable expert opinion he must have some 
idea of the bases of that opinion and the data relied upon. I f the attorney is 
required to await examination at trial to get this information, he often will 
have too little time to recognize and expose vulnerable spots in the 
testimony. Id. (quoting Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse 
Party's Expert Information, 14 STAN. L.REY. 455, 485 
(1962))."Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho 176, 181,219 P.3d 1192, 1197 
(2009).293 
Over the City'S objection, the DC permitted McGourty to testify.294 Not only was the 
DC's admission of the evidence an abuse of discretion from a procedural perspective, but also 
the grounds upon which the DC admitted the testimony were particularly erroneous. 
292 Tr. 7784, LL. 12 - 14. 
293 Radmer v. Ford Molar Co. 120 1 daho 86, 89, 813 P .2d 897, 900 (1991 ). (emphasis added). 
294 Tr. p. 7748, L. 12 - p. 7751, L. 16. 
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Despite the fact that McGourty was not disclosed as an expert witnesses, the Court 
permitted McGourty to testify as to the amount of damage, or cost, related to repairs to TMC's 
defective masonry work.295 Rather than treat these topics as matters of expert disclosure, the DC 
concluded that his testimony was in the nature of a lay witness and thus admissible.296 Further, 
McGourty's held no factual knowledge as a basis for his opinions in this regard, i.e., there were 
no 'perceptions' by the witness that formed the basis for a lay opinion; there was no foundation 
" h ... d 297 lor t e opmIOn testimony expresse . 
The DC failed to identify the matter as one of the exercise of discretion, failed to address 
why it would allow the previously undisclosed expert opinion while strictly applying the 
Scheduling Order as against the City, and failed to state or exercise any reason in its decision to 
allow the previously undisclosed expert opinion. Instead, the DC merely called this faux expert 
witnesses testimony that of a "fact witness".298 Given the significance the DC gave to McGourty, 
the City was severely prejudiced by the admission of this testimony, expert or otherwise, and the 
DC abused its discretion in allowing the testimony. The DC relied on McGourty's testimony for 
Finding 113, that the cost of repairing the TMC's defective masonry was only $6,000.299 With 
the improperly admitted testimony excluded, Finding 113 is clearly erroneous. Thus, the only 
credible testimony, was of the City expert, Todd Weltner, an Idaho licensed General Contractor, 
295 R. 8275, ~ 113; Tr. p. 7748, L. 12 p. 7753, L. 6. 
296 Tr. p. 7457, L. 17 - 21. 
297 I.R.E. Rule 701. 
298 Tr. p. 7748, LL. 24 25. 
299 R. 8275, ~ 113. 
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who's admissible, and credible expert opinion set the value of the repairs at $1,265,000. 300 The 
DC's error must be reversed, and the admissible expert opinion of the City utilized as the 
measure of fixing damages resulting from Petra's failure to inspect and reject the defective work 
ofTMC. 
b. The Work of Western Roofing was Defective and Deficient and 
Petra Failed to Inspect and Reject Western's Work. 
Despite acknowledging that the roof leaked immediately upon installation, the DC 
nonetheless refused to assign any liability to Petra.301 This conclusion is at odds with the 
undisputed testimony of Petra's own witness who testified that the roof construction failed to 
meet the requirements of the Contract Documents and which testimony was further confirmed by 
the City's expert.302 The City presented multiple undisputed examples of defective and deficient 
work relating to the roof, including but not limited to defective and deficient comer caps,303 
defective and deficient roof penetrations, 304 defective, and deficient roof instaliation.305 In fact, 
the evidence demonstrated that the roof continues to leak even more than 2 years after move 
in. 306lt was unambiguously and expressly Petra's duty to inspect and reject deficient and 
defective work and Petra failed to do SO.307 The DC committed clear error in this regard; its 
300 Tr. p. 3757, L. 25 - p. 3762, L. 1 
301 R. 8277 - 8288, ~~ 127 - 135. 
302 Tr. p. 7993, L. 2 25; Tr. p. 7996, L. 12 22; Tr. p. 7999, LL. 3-22; Tr. p. 8000, L. 3 - 18; 
Tr. p. 944, L. 20 - p. 945, L. 16; 
303 See, Appendix G. 
304 Tr. p. 7988, L. 20 - p. 7989, L. 5; S'ee, Appendix H. 
305 Tr. 7992, L. 6 p. 7996, L. 22; See, Appendix I. 
306 . Tr. p. 945, L. 13 16, Tr. p. 278, L. 2 - 10. 
307 Ex. 2003, p. 16, §§4.7.9, 4.7.10. 
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conclusions should be reversed. The DC erred in rejecting the undisputed damage testimony of 
Weatherholt presented at trial in the amount of $450,000.308 
c. The Work of Buss Mechanical was Defective and Deficient and 
Petra 'Knowingly' Failed to Inspect and Reject Buss' Work. 
Petra knowingly allowed a Prime Contractor to install the wrong materials in the 
building. Buss Mechanical Services, Inc. ("Buss") provided the plumbing and piping on the 
MCH. Petra's own Daily Reports evidence Petra's breach of contract. Petra knowingly allowed 
Buss to improperly install plastic PVC piping below grade in the basement, knowing that the 
specifications specifically called for hub less cast iron pipe to be used.309 When it was discovered, 
Petra's own Daily Reports call out that the Mechanical Engineer for the project had a "cow": 
div-I5: Buss, Hobson continued to install over head at basement. 
Mechanical engineer is having a cow with PVC being used in the 
basement the specifications only call out cast. We allowed PVC to be used 
in the underground only. Buss has error in using PVc. Charlie is aware of 
the issue.310 
Not only did Petra fail to reject the improper substitution of plastic for cast Iron, it 
knowingly allowed the PVC to be used, and did nothing. 
Lenny Buss, the President of Buss, testified that Petra "allowed him" to substitute PVC 
plastic piping for the "hub less cast iron piping" below grade of the basement of the building.311 
The DC erred as a matter of law in its interpretation of the contract and disregarded Petra's 
308 Tr. p. 954, L. 14 - p. 955, L. 6. 
309Ex.2130,p.105,div.15. 
3IOEx.2130,p.105. 
311 Tr. p. 8991, L. 12 - p. 8992, L. 6. 
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admitted failure to perform its duty to inspect and reject any installation work that failed to 
conform to the Contract Documents. 
C. THE DC ERRED BY DISREGARDING CREDIBLE EVIDENCE OF DAMAGES. 
Petra made a strategic decision at trial, to rely on the same flawed theories now shown to 
be the foundation of the DC's errors in fact and law. The DC's failure to address each element 
of the damage claims, failure to provide analysis, and failure to justify in any fashion its 'made 
of whole cloth' conclusion that City damages were speculative does not withstand judicial 
scrutiny. 
"The rule applicable to all witnesses, whether parties or interested in the event of an 
action, is, that either a board, court, or jury must accept as true the positive, uncontradicted 
testimony of a credible witness, unless his testimony is inherently improbable, or rendered so by 
facts and circumstances disclosed at the hearing or trial. 312 In Jeffrey v. Trouse, 100 Mont. 538, 
50 P.2d 872, 874 (1935), it is held that neither the trial court nor a jury may arbitrarily or 
capriciously disregard the testimony of a witness unimpeached by any of the modes known to the 
law, if such testimony does not exceed probability.,,313 Damages need be proved only with a 
reasonable certainty and courts have determined this simply means that existence of damages 
must be taken out of the realm ofspeculation.314 
Here, with respect to each of the City's experts on damages, save one (HVAC), the DC 
failed to determine their testimony to be not credible, nor were these witnesses testimony found 
to be improbable. The DC failed to provide any rationale, reasoning, or explanation for its 
conclusion as to the evidence being speculative. Thus, the DC arbitrarily rejected the 
uncontradicted testimony of the following credible experts: I) Neil Anderson regarding the 
312 Manley v. Harvey Lumber Co., 175 Minn. 489, 221 N.W. 913, 914 (1933). 
313 Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 626-27, 603 P.2d 575, 581-82 (1979). 
314 Anderson & Nafdger v. G. T Newcomb. Inc .. 100 Idaho 175, 182-83,595 P.2d 709, 716-17 (1979). 
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Water Features; 2) Ray Wetherholt regarding the Roof; 3) Todd Weltner regarding the Masonry 
and Mayor's Reception; and 4) Steve Amento regarding Liquidated Damages. 
Petra, in reliance upon its flawed theories, failed to call any expert to oppose the damage 
testimony from these witness as to these items. The uncontested damages for the water features 
is $315,000,315 the roof is $450,000,316 the masonry is $1,265,000/ 17 the Mayor's reception area 
is $95,850,318 and the liquidated damages of $1,650,000. 319 Each witness testified that the 
damages were in accord with a reasonable degree of professional certainty, and based upon their 
expert qualifications in engineering, construction, and construction contract administration. The 
DC's unexplained, unsupported, and arbitrary conclusion as to speculation is a direct violation of 
the rules established in Dinneen, supra, and must be disregarded. The damage testimony of these 
credible witnesses stands unimpeached in the record. 
D. THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO ALLOW THE CITY TO AMEND ITS COMPLAINT 
TO ADD ADDITIONAL CLAIMS. 
By Motion For Leave to File First Amended Complaint and Add Claim for Punitive 
Damages dated March 31, 2010, the City sought to amend its complaint to add claims for unjust 
enrichment, fraud/fraud in the inducement, and constructive fraud. In addition the Motion sought 
to add a claim for punitive damages.32o The DC denied the City'S motion by Order dated 
September 27, 2010.321 Although the Order addresses, at length, the City'S motion to add a 
3 I 5 Tr. p. 790, LL. 3-25. 
316 Tr. p. 954, LL. 14-24. 
317 Tr. p. 3757, L. 21 - p. 3758, L. 9. 
318 Tr. p. 3735, L. 16 - p. 3736, L. 3. 
319 Tr. p. 4680, L. 20 - p. 4681, L. 3. 
320 R. 975. 
321 R. 6521. 
-72-
punitive damage claim, the Order fails to address the City's motion to add the aforementioned 
additional claims. To the extent the Order addresses the City's fraud claim, the DC applies 
something akin to a summary judgment standard, rather than the appropriate motion to amend 
standard when it says: 
[T]he Court is not persuaded that the evidence found in the record is 
sufficient to provide Meridian a reasonable likelihood of proving the 
fraudulent and outrageous behavior that evidence a bad act and bad intent 
required by the case law and the statute. Therefore, Meridian's Motion for 
leave to file a First Amended Complaint to add a claim for punitive 
damages is DENIED.322 
The DC erred in its application of a 'summary judgment standard. "It is well settled that, 
in the interest of justice, courts should favor liberal grants of leave to amend, (I.R.C.P. 15(a); 
Markstaller v. Markstaller, 80 Idaho 129, 326 P.2d 994 (1958).,,323 "A court abuses its 
discretion if it fails to act consistently with legal standards. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 568, 
165 P.3d 273, 282 (2007).,,324The DC abused its discretion when it failed to even discuss the 
proposed amended claims other than the punitive damage claim. 
E. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES. 
The DC abused its discretion in finding that Petra was the prevailing party. Based upon 
what should have been a dismissal of Petra's claims under either ITCA, Section 7, or Section 8 
of the contract, and a finding of Petra's breach as demonstrated above, the DC's award of fees to 
Petra must be vacated. Likewise an award of attorney fees in favor of the City, both at trial and 
upon appeal is mandated. 
322 R. 6521. 
323 Wickstrom v. N Idaho Call., III Idaho 450, 453, 725 P.2d 155, 158 (1986) 
324 Toddv. Sullivan Canst. LLC, 146 Idaho 118,121,191 P.3d 196, 199 (2008) 
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Further, the DC erred in its award of fees as a result of its failure to perform any of the 
analysis required by Rule 54. It appears that the DC relied exclusively upon the Contract as the 
basis for the award of the entirety of the fees and costs claimed by Petra. "The appl ication of [a] 
procedural rule is a question of law on which we exercise free review.,,325 "I.R.C.P. 54( e) is only 
applicable if the reasonableness criteria found in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) is not inconsistent with the 
attorney fees provision in the contract. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(8).,,326 I.R.C.P. 54(e)(8) states: "The 
provisions of this Rule 54(e) relating to attorney fees shall be applicable ... to any claim for 
attorney fees made pursuant ... to any contract, to the extent that the application of this Rule 
54(e) to such a claim for attorney fees would not be inconsistent with such other ... contract." 
Here, the Contract explicitly permitted only an award of "reasonable attorney fees" to the 
prevailing party - not actual attorney fees. 327 As such, the contract provision is subject to the 
requirements of I.R.C.P. 54(e). Here the DC did not engage in any of the required analysis 
mandated by the Rule, thus erring in the award of fees. 
F. THE CITY IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES ON ApPEAL. 
Under Section 10.6 of the contract,328 and under I.c. § 12-120(3), upon reversal of the DC, the 
City is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal. Under Section 10.6 of the contract,329 
upon reversal of the DC, the City is entitled to an award of attorney fees at trial. 
325 Zenner v. Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444, 450, 210 P.3d 552, 558 (2009) (citation omitted). 
326 Id. 
327 Zenner, 147 Idaho at 451, 210 P.3d 559. 
328 Ex. 2003, p. 24, § 10.6. 
329 Ex. 2003, p. 24, §10.6. 
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v. CONCLUSION 
The DC Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law are based on clearly erroneous factual 
findings and incorrect application of law. The DC found Petra had prevailed on its Counterclaim 
without any finding that the City had in fact breached any provision of the CMA. The DC 
awarded Petra damages based on a claim of waiver, that had never been pled, which claim was 
unsupported by facts. 
The DC determined that the City had waived the express notice and pre-approval 
provisions of the CMA. The DC reached this conclusion, disregarding the evidence that: 
(1) Petra had known for at least eight months, of the circumstances giving rise to the alleged 
claim, in advance of the purported 'notice'; and (2) Petra had actually commenced and 
completed perfonning claimed "additional services" related to aspects of the alleged changes in 
the project construction; and (3) Petra, on four specific occasions, obtained the City's consent to 
the changes on the pretense that there would, in fact, be no increase in the Fee or Reimbursable 
Expenses as a result. After ignoring this evidence, the DC then awarded Petra damages based on 
extrinsic evidence of an arbitrarily chosen percentage "contract rate" not found in the CMA and 
directly contrary to contractual provisions which clearly provided that any increase in the Fee or 
Reimbursable should relate to the actual material increase in services (the Fee) or expenditures 
(Reimbursable) that were tracked as related to each change. 
Even more perplexing, the DC concluded that City had not proven its claim for breach of 
contract, but acknowledged that Petra had "overcharged" the City, and awarded damages as an 
offset to Petra's claim. Despite the specific, and simply calculated, evidence of over $223,775.76 
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in overcharges, the DC determined that it would be "exceptionally difficult and time consuming" 
to identify precisely as to what charges and what amounts Petra overcharged the City, leaving the 
parties to speculate as to the basis for the $52,000 award in favor of the City. 
The DC acknowledged Petra's "substantial error" as to a $40,000 Petra requested 
overpayment, as well as defects in the construction including: a) the misalignment and improper 
installation of masonry; b) a leaking roof; c) missing materials and workmanship allowing water 
and bug infiltration; and d) defects in the water features. Despite these findings, the DC ignored 
the City's evidence of damages in the amount of $3,851,337.50 and summarily dismissed the 
entire proof of damages as "speculative" and "minor". 
The DC findings and fact and conclusions of law fail to withstand even the most 
deferential level of scrutiny. The DC findings and conclusions are premised upon erroneous 
characterizations of the evidence, incorrect legal standards, and, purely arbitrary speculation. 
Accordingly, the City requests that this Court reverse the conclusion that Petra has prevailed on 
its counterclaim, reverse the award of attorney fees to Petra as a result, reverse the conclusion 
that the City had not proven its claims against Petra and is entitled to its substantial damages as 
presented at trial. Concomitant with such a reversal, are awards of attorney fees to the City at 
trial and upon appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of April, 2012. 
TROUT· JONES • GLEDI ILL • FUHRMAN • GOURLEY, P.A. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
-76-
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
The undersigned does hereby certify that the electronic brief submitted is in compliance 
with all of the requirements set out in I.A.R. 34.1, and that an electronic copy was served on each 
party on a Compact Disc via hand delivery. 
Dated and certified this 16th day of April, 2012. 
Kim J. Trout 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on April 16, 2012 a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing document was forwarded addressed as follows in the manner stated below: 
Thomas G. Walker 
MacKenzie Whatcott 
COSHO HUMPHREY, LLP 
800 Park Blvd., Ste. 790 
P.O. Box 9518 
Boise, ID 83707-9518 
Fax: (208) 639-5609 
J. Frederick Mack 
Scott Hess 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701 
Fax: (208) 343-8869 
Theodore William Baird Jr. 
Meridian City Attorney's Office 
33 E. Broadway Avenue 
Meridian, ID 83642 
Fax: (208) 489-0483 
-77-
Hand Delivered 
U.S. Mail 
Fax 
Fed. Express 
Email 
Hand Delivered 
U.S. Mail 
Fax 
Fed. Express 
Email 
Hand Delivered 
u.S. Mail 
Fax 
Fed. Express 
Email 
Kim J. Trout 
[J 
D 
D 
D 
D 
[J 
D 
D 
D 
D 
[J 
D 
D 
D 
D 


Ex. 2198, p. 200 
Aerial Photo of West (Rear) Face of City Hall 
Appendix "A"- Page I 
Ex. 2155. p. 65 Detail C I (Veneer Detail) 
Detail of Metal Flashing (extending from behind upper stone course. down and over opening. and down over face of lower stone course) 
Arrow points to 
hightlighted, 
required, metal 
ng that is 
missing, and 
needed to cover 2" 
inch opening 
between stone 
VENEER DETAIL 
Appendix "A"- Page 2 
Ex. 2198, p. 200 
Aerial Photo of West (Rear) Face of City Hall- Photo Enlarged to Show Missing Flashing Approx.20' in Length 
Enlargement, and arrows, presented on Courtroom Monitors using 
TrialSmart Software During Trial 
Appendix "A"· Page 3 
Ex. 2198, p. 202 
Aerial Photo of East (Front) Face of City Hall 
Appendix "A" - Page 4 
Ex. 2198, p. 202 
Aerial Photo of East (Front) Face of City Hall- Photo Enlarged to Show Missing Flashing Approx.20' in Length 
Appendix "Au - Page 5 
Ex. 2680 p. I 0 
Photo showing measurement of the opening, not covered by the missing flashing, 
on the East face of Meridian City Hall 
Measuring of 
(East Front) 
Appendix "A"- Page 6 
Ex. 2680 p. 30 
Second Photo showing measurement of the opening. not covered by the missing flashing. 
on the East face of Meridian City Hall. Also illustrating mis-aligned stone work at corner. 
Appendix "A"- Page 7 
8 
APPENI)IX "B" 
(Please turn to page 2 for Chart) 
Appendix "B" - Page 1 
Appendix "B" 
Chart from Admitted Exhibits & Testimony 
Demonstrating what Petra knew and when Petra Knew it. 
Services Begin 9/112006 1115/2007 2112/2007 4/2/2007 7/12/2007 8/20/2007 I , 
Budget S12.2MI Increased to Increased to Increased to Increased to Petra Knew 
$15M2 $16M3 $18M4 $20M5 for 8 Months 
Increased Size 80,000° 101,008' 101,0008 Petra Knew I , 
(SF) for 8 Months I 
Basement i 4 Floors Foundation Completed Petra Knew I 
I Inel. Full began Basementll for 6 months. 
I Basement9 51712007 10 Provided I Services for 
I 
4 months I 
Contaminated Soils I Discovered Began Accounted 
("CS") I CS at end of Removing for 14 
Februarv12 CSI3 
Upgraded Office, Provided I Provided Provided Knownl8 Petra Knew Exterior. HV AC, etc ... Estimate l5 Estimatel6 Estimate!? for 2 Months 
LEED i Provided Petra Knew 
I I Estimatel9 for 1 Month 
Upgraded Plaza Provided i Provided No Changed No Change2J 
Estimate20 Estimate21 
Fee $574,00024 No No Change20 No Change27 No Change"" Spreadsheet 
Change25 with Fee 
Increase29 
Reimbursable $279,812,(j No No ChangeJL NoChangeJ:J No Change~4 No Change" 
Expenses ChangeJi 
Petra's Action Signed Represented Represented Represented Represented Spreadsheet 
Contract No Change No Change No Change No Change with Fee 
in Fee & in Fee & in Fee & in Fee & Increase 
Expenses I Expenses Expenses Expenses 
Appendix "B" - Page 2 
I Ex. 2003, p. 13, § 4.4(1). 
2 Ex. 2007, "Construction Costs, Total Construction Cost." 
3 Ex. 2183, "Construction Costs, Total Construction Estimate." 
4 Ex. 2145, "Total Project Costs, Total Project Costs w/FFE, before Alternates." 
5 Ex. 2184, "Total Project Costs, Total Project Costs before Alternates." 
6 Ex. 2003, p. 5 Recitals" B. 
7 Ex. 2132, p. 50, "Building: 101,008 SF;" Ex. 2025, pp. 45-46. 
8 Ex. 2025, pp. 45-46. 
9 Ex. 2132, p. 50, "Building Level: 4." 
10 Tr. p. 5679, LL. 4-6; Ex. 755, p. 4; (NOTE: Petra began excavating for the foundation on May 7, 2007. It 
appears in the April column due to size limitations.) 
II Ex. 755, p. 4. 
12 Tr. p. 5520, LL. 2-5. 
13 Tr. 5376, LL. 21-24. 
14 Ex. 2184, "Construction Mgmt & Site Acquisition Costs," LL. 2 & 2a. 
15 Ex. 2007, "Construction Costs," L 2. 
16 Ex. 2183, "Construction Costs," L 2. 
17 Ex. 2145, "Construction Costs," L 2. 
18 Ex. 2136, p. 116, Item 00007; (NOTE: It appears in the July column due to size limitations.) 
Ex. 2184, "Construction Costs," L 2; Ex. 2025, pp. 45-46. 
19 Ex. 2184. "Construction Costs," L 5; Ex. 2025, pp. 45-46. 
20 Ex. 2007, "Construction Costs," L 3. 
21 Ex. 2183, "Construction Costs," L 3. 
22 Ex. 2145, "Construction Costs," L 3; Ex. 2183, "Construction Costs," L 3. 
23 Ex. 2184, "Construction Costs," L 3; Ex. 2145, "Construction Costs," L 3. 
24 Ex.2003,p.17,§6.1. 
25 Ex. 2007, "Construction Mgmt & Site Acquisition Cost," L. 3; Ex. 2003, p. 17, § 6.1. 
26 Ex. 2183, "Construction Mgmt & Site Acquisition Cost," L. 3; Ex. 2003, p. 17, § 6.1. 
27 Ex. 2145, "Construction Mgmt & Site Acquisition Cost," L. 4; Ex. 2003, p. 17, § 6.1. 
2B Ex. 2184, "Construction Mgmt & Site Acquisition Costs," L. 4; Ex. 2003, p. 17, § 6.1. 
29 Ex. 2148, "General Conditions & Fees," LL. 77-78; Ex. 2003, p. 17, § 6.1. 
30 Ex. 2007, "Construction Mgmt & Site Acquisition Cost," LL. 2-3; Ex. 2003, pp. 17-18, §§ 6.2.2(a) & (b). 
31 Ex. 2007, "Construction Mgmt & Site Acquisition Cost," L. 2; Ex. 2003, pp. 17-18, §§ 6.2.2(a) & (b). 
32 Ex. 2183, "Construction Mgmt & Site Acquisition Cost," L. 2; Ex. 2003, pp. 17-18, §§ 6.2.2(a) & (b). 
33 Ex. 2145, "Construction Mgmt & Site Acquisition Cost," L. 3; Ex. 2003, pp. 17-18, §§ 6.2.2(a) & (b). 
34 Ex. 2184, "Construction Mgmt & Site Acquisition Costs," L. 3; Ex. 2003, pp. 17-18, §§ 6.2.2(a) & (b). 
35 Ex. 2148, "General Conditions & Fees," L. 71; Ex. 2003, pp. 17-18, §§ 6.2.2.(a) & (b). 
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Ex.21S9 
p.449 
Water Feature Submittal Requirements 
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Appendix "e" 
a 
Ex. 2680 p. 30 
Second Photo showing measurement of the opening, not covered by the missing flashing, 
on the East face of Meridian City Hall. Also illustrating mis-aligned stone work at corner. 
tnn""C"lr,,, flashing 
nt is not mortar but caulking 
alignment Appendix "D"- Page I 
Ex.2680.p.6 
Photo of missing grout and poor grout workmanship. 
Failed mortar joint 
Appendix "D"- Page 2 rout is lighter and not clean 
tight 
Ex. 2680, p. 5 
Photo poor grout workmanship . 
• 
Appendix "D"- Page 3 
Color of mortar is different 
Tooling different within these four stones 
Joint is not clean and tight 
Stone discoloration 
3 
Ex. 2680, p. 41 
• 
Appendix "E" - Page 1 
C> 
o 
o 
o 
C> 
a;; 
Ex.2194,p.9 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 2194 
Case No. CV OC 2009-07257 
Page No.9 
Appendix "E"- Page 2 
Location: 
Lower roof on the 
north side of the 
building 
Ex.2194,p.30 
• 
Location: 
Outside corner where the 
Appendix "E" _ Page 3 east meets the north plane 
w 
w 
Ex.2194,p.33 
I /J~U nlltf, f-.\tllhu 1194 
(';.1'(" .\i(l. C" ()(' '::009·07~57 
P<.Jf!c ~u_ J.\ 
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Location: 
Parapet 
Ex. 2680, p. I 3 
" .. 
, .: ~ 
• •••• 
. ~ '. . 
.. ' 
• • 
Appendix "E"- Page 5 Location: 
East elevation 
Ex.2680,p.19 
Location: 
Appendix "E" - Page 6 East elevation 
Ex.2680,p.20 
Appendix "E" - Page 7 
not 
Ex.2680,p.21 
Appendix "E" - Page 8 
Ex. 2680, p. 22 
Appendix "E" - Page 9 
Ex. 2680, p. 32 
Appendix "E" - Page \ 0 
Location: 
Southeast corner 
of the lower roof 
F 
Ex. 2680, p.49 - MeasuringTMC's MasonryWorkmanship 
Appendix "F"- Page I 
Measuring TMC's 
Masonry 
Workmansh 
Ex. 2194, p. 21- Measuring TMC's Masonry Workmanship 
Appendix "F" - Page 2 
Measuring TMC's 
Masonry 
Workmanship 
Ex. 2194, p. 26 - Measuring TMe's Masonry Workmanship 
Measuring TMC's 
Masonry 
Workmanship 
~ 000028 
Appendix "F" - Page 3 
Ex. 2680, p. 9 - MeasuringTMC's MasonryWorkmanship 
Ex. 2680, p. 14 - Measuring TMC's Masonry Workmanship 
Appendix " F" - Page 5 Measuring TMC's 
Masonry 
Workmanship 
Ex. 2680, p. 16 - Measuring TMC's Masonry Workmanship 
Appendix "F" - Page 6 
Ex. 2680, p. 25 - Measuring TMC's Masonry Workmanship 
-
"II 
~~ 
I~ -§ UI~ ~." ',:, 
CD 
Appendix "F" - Page 7 
Ex. 2680, p. 35 - Measuring TMe's Masonry Workmanship 
i- (7 • 
Measuring TMC's 
Masonry 
Appendix "F" - Page 8 Workmanship 
-Ex. 2680, p. 40 - Measuring TMC's Masonry Workmanship 
Measuring TMC's 
Masonry 
Workmanshi 
Appendix "F" - Page 9 
Ex. 2680, p. 24 - Measuring TMe's Masonry Workmanship 
Enlargement 
,;..:,:" 
,. , 
., 
j 
~, ' 
t· 
Measuring TMC's 
Masonry 
Workmanship 
• Tr. p. 3670, L. 25 - p. 3671, L. 9 
" ... 5/16 of an inch alignment, which 
is five times the allowable tolerance." 
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G 
Ex. 2159, p. 65 Detail D6 (Coping Corner Detail) 
Detail of Metal I Piece Corner 
(1 PIECE CORNER 
UNIT) 
COPING CORNER DET. 
SCALE 1/2" = 1'-0" 0098 
Appendix "G"- Page I 
Ex. 2198, p. I - Western's Corner Coping Installation 
Appendix "G"- Page 2 
H 
Ex. 2159. p. 49 Detail E2 (Roof Penetration Detaill) 
Detail of Metal Flashing to Cover all Roof Penetrations 
./ I: .. 1 
~I r-------------~ 
= r-- ;::=============, 
-- I:=-- c:::I 
1 r 
"L ' - ~--~- ,-------------
=-:~Ii ...... - 1======::...! 
C't =U ' ! 
. . 
" liz 
(,\) -r.: 0i5>40.C 
r- 015>40113 
ROOF PENETRATION 
3" :::: 1'-0" D055 
Appendix "H" - Page I 
Ex. 2198, p. 58 . Western's Roof Penetration Installation· 
Missing Required Flashing 
• 
Plaintiff, Exhibit 21\lg 
Case No. CV 0(' 2{X)'l·{)7257 
Pa1i" .58 
Appendix "H"· Page 2 
CM116772 
• 

Ex. 2159. p. 55 Detail C3 (Sill Detail) 
Detail of Reglet Under Stone Near Windows and Doors 
~400.B 
(6 ") -
01210.6 
(R- I':)) 
SILL DETAIL 
SCALE: 3" :; " - 0" 
~0841 1.6 
08411.61 
0 l 620.Cs 
o 
Metal 'reglet' to 
_~ I----- -lhold and seal 
0063 
roofing material as 
"watertight" 
Appendix "1"- Page 1 
Ex. 2159, p. 52 Detail 3 (Door Sill Detail) 
Detail of Door Sill Material Overlap 
@102@E 
SCALE 1-1/2" = 1'-0" 0216 
Appendix "1"- Page 2 
Ex. 2198, p. 39 - Western's Sill Installation 
PIiMdll)'\, b.hihil 2! % 
Ca'H' N,) (V 0(" 1{)()0,H7:57 
Pa~l,: :--';0 ,N 
Appendix "1"- Page 3 
No metal seal 
